CONFERENCE REPORT

TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS:
ARE WE MEETING THE NEED?

The 10th annual IAPTC conference was hosted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana from 23rd to 29th October, 2004.
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<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
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<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ASDR</td>
<td>African Security Dialogue and Research</td>
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<td>BPU</td>
<td>Best Practices Unit (UNDPKO)</td>
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<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>ECOBRIG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>IMTC</td>
<td>International Management Training Centre</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MTC</td>
<td>Management Training Centre</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NODEFIC</td>
<td>Norwegian Defence Force International Centre</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PBL</td>
<td>Problem-Based Learning</td>
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<td>PDCMPS</td>
<td>Projet de Développement des Capacités en Maintien de la Paix et Sécurité</td>
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<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Centre</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>Stand Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>Specialized Police Unit</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangement System</td>
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<td>ZIF</td>
<td>Centre for International Peace Operations</td>
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Conference Overview in Brief

I. Summary of Outcomes
A. Overall
   1. Questions to be answered: How can multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural cooperation and coordination at strategic, operational, and tactical levels be improved?
      a. Need for guidance - there are no established positions, policies, or doctrines with respect to activities such as setting up joint operations or campaign plans (Harland)
         a. Why STM3 is so important- was started in a void
         b. Without proper guidance mission plans and roles must be continually reinvented.
      b. Improve terminology - definitions must be clarified; terms have different range of meanings due to translation
      c. Challenges of Peace Operations project- goal is to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership and make practical recommendations to this end. This has resulted in several journal articles, influenced SG's annual report, etc.
      d. Interagency cooperation needs to be improved- training institutions need to at least know what one another are up to and who can meet particular client training requests.
      e. Course content must be accurate and current.
      f. Establish adequate assessment and evaluation mechanisms, and incorporate these findings into course curriculum
      g. Integrated training at basic, generic level – “Peacekeeping 101” with possibility of expansion to DDR, HR, etc if successful.
     2. Recommendations should address:
        a. How can governments, with differing resources and capabilities best respond?
           a. Less competition between training centres- strategic partners, regional course-sharing, etc.
           b. Less donor selfishness- fund training gaps, not what is in interest or field of donor
           c. Hard copies of all UN training materials would benefit developing countries with lack of computer access
        b. And what might be the most helpful ways in which member states could support UN peacekeeping operations?
           a. Adopt STMs- will provide training standards
              i. Level 1- basic level for peace keepers began in 2002
              ii. Level 2- middle-ranking military and civilian police officers, modules not yet completed but in field testing
              iii. Level 3- senior mission management in development process
           b. Link training and deployment
           c. Adhere to UN standards - civilian security training, UN civilian police, etc
        c. Mandates need to be clarified

B. Military
1. Education vs training: elements of PSO training should be incorporated into basic training/career development if the nation’s foreign policy agenda dictates this need (e.g., In Ghana’s constitution to go on PSOs)
2. Challenge continues to be adapting trained fighters to drawn out, indecisive roll of peacekeeping.
3. Shortfalls include the need for language training, a flexible and adaptive training doctrine, and mistrust of the civilian element.

C. Police
1. Screening and a proper selection process remain both a challenge and a priority. Clear standards set by the UN must be adhered to by the member states.
2. Should not be a “dumping ground” for unmotivated or substandard national officers.
3. Training should be standardised – STM 1 big step in right direction, can be improved.

D. Civilian
1. Essential that civilians undergo security training. More civilians die on peacekeeping missions than military or civilian police officers. Training needs to include non-conventional conflict resolution topics, such as report writing and 4 x 4 driving (auto accidents #1 cause of death in the field)
2. Integrated training so that civilians become familiar with military and police culture.
3. Sheer number of organisations involved in civilian peacekeeping training cycle makes linking training, recruitment, and deployment the major challenge for the civilian sector.

E. Well, Are we Meeting the Need?

II. Procedural Outcomes

A. Summary of AGM
1. CECOPAC has offered venue for 2006; offers for 2007 should be made to the current President, KAIPTC, or Secretariat
2. Importance in taking committee chairmanships seriously – show up and work in the meantime to improve your committee.
3. Discussion of another institution taking over the Secretariat
4. Suggestions:
   a. Assign issues for multi-functional groups to consider so that they do not all choose the same issue next time.
   b. Do not extend the Conference length
   c. Consider breaking up multi-functional discussion groups by levels
   d. Consider distributing lists of discussion teams one or two weeks in advance so some may prepare if they wish
   e. Theme: Instead of leaving it up solely the host/secretariat, how about a call for papers in March after Executive Committee meeting?
   f. Consider nominating vice-chairmen in case the chairman is otherwise engaged.
   g. Reverse order of committees. Meet as functional first, then multi-functional. For civilians, especially, sector is so diverse no one knows who’s coming to the Conference. Team-building and issues would then be clearer going into the multi-functional
   h. Focus more on future developments.
   i. Need proposals (charging Presidency and Executive Committee with this) for how to elect chairs
j. Have larger UN delegation present

III. The Way Forward
   A. New Delhi - Mon, 31 Oct - Tues, 1 Nov 2005
      1. Theme: Cooperation and Coordination
   B. Changes Most Likely for 2005 IAPTC
Session I Opening Session

1. Welcome by Major General E K Sam (Ghanaian Council of State) - Are Peace Operations Meeting the Need? A West African Prospective.

Introduction
The theme of this conference is "Training for peace operations: are we meeting the need?" It is a very apt theme for this annual conference of peacekeeping training centres, but one I shall leave for you, the experts, to address. I shall limit myself to sharing my views on a higher-order question: Are peace operations meeting the need for a stable post-conflict environment in Africa?

The Nature of African Conflicts
In 1994, Robert Kaplan described the wars in Sierra Leone and in Liberia as anarchic, criminal violence that would lead to a Hobbesian state of nature, where each man is a wolf unto his fellow man. According to Kaplan, these conflicts represented "... a microcosm of what is happening in West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal or regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war." He described a kind of war that is not politically motivated, but criminally driven, with dispossessed urban youths wreaking vengeance on societies that had left them despairing and poor.¹

The crisis of predatory warlordism in West Africa - which began with an armed rebellion in Liberia in 1989, and then spread to Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast - is itself a microcosm of a global trend towards an increasing number of intrastate conflicts of apparent racial, religious and ethnic derivation. A growing number of civilians, as opposed to armies and security forces, have become victims of armed violence, often for no obvious or clearly articulated political reason. These conflicts have increasingly occurred where beleaguered state governments lose control over substantial parts of their territories, and no longer have a monopoly of force. As John McKinlay puts it:

"The control of armed force often devolves into the hands of a variety of sub-national groupings, and the civilian population becomes the principal target of violence. In such circumstances, the control, division, relocation and even extermination of civilians becomes a primary war aim of opposing forces."²

In other words, we have been facing a number of "complex emergencies", which may be defined as large-scale emergencies caused wholly or partly by an armed conflict, which tends to combine an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large-scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, resulting in large numbers of displaced persons.³ However defined, or whatever the causes, we know that complex emergencies wreck and destroy national, governmental, social, civil and trading structures within a country. Such situations have called for a more holistic approach to peace operations that goes beyond military and security priorities to address issues of development, governance, legitimacy, political and social inclusiveness, and economic equity. The dominant forms of conflict afflicting our region thus created the need for multifunctional peace operations.

Multifunctional Peace Operations

Over the past 15 years, Africa has been a testing ground for new planning and implementation of United Nations peace operations. From Namibia and Mozambique in the early 1990s to Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire today, the learning from each mission has influenced the course and outcome of the next. Some countries, such as Liberia, bear witness to earlier failures of peace operations, and the current mission in that country is attempting to avoid the mistakes of the earlier ECOWAS and UN efforts ahead of the July 1997 elections.

Progress in the development of peace operations has not, however, been even. By the mid ‘90s, after several perceived peacekeeping failures (notably in Rwanda, Somalia and Angola), it was thought that severe limits should be imposed on the concept and conduct of peace operations. A 1996 New York Times article stated, for example, that: “Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ... there should be a shift back towards more limited objectives like policing cease-fires. UN peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It makes no sense to continue eroding it’s credibility by asking it to do what it cannot”.

On the other hand, others were committed to alleviating the ongoing human suffering caused by armed conflicts. Not least among them was UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan who boldly stated in 1998 that: “Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only re-thinking the means, but also the methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security Council.”

The commitment of the UN to learn from its implementation successes and failures became evident in the Brahimi Report, commissioned by Annan and published in August of 2000. Many of the report’s recommendations have been adopted in peace operations planning at the UN - operations which are now widely accepted as multi-dimensional operations which focus on security as well as on political, economic and social solutions, with an integration of tasks under one mandate.

The African Union

In parallel with developments at the UN level, the African Union has been preparing for an enhanced role in the maintenance of continental peace and security - most pertinently through the establishment of a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. In order to back the resolutions of the Council, the AU is developing a common security policy and will establish, by 2010, an African Standby Force (ASF) capable of rapid deployment to keep or enforce the peace. The force will comprise of standby brigades in each of the five African regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity as well.

However, the AU’s capacity to handle conflicts is being severely tested, way ahead of the establishment timelines for the ASF. In addition to the AU mission in Burundi, which was recently transformed into a UN operation, the AU has spearheaded attempts to resolve the complex emergency in the Darfur region of western Sudan. The African Union deployed troops to Darfur to monitor an April ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese Government and the opposing movements - the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The first substantial peace talks took place in Abuja, Nigeria, under the Union’s auspices, from 23 August to 18 September 2004, where the parties reached agreement on humanitarian issues, and made some progress on security issues.

Now the task facing an expanded AU force in Darfur will be to enforce peace over an area as large as France, where government-backed Janjaweed fighters have routed more than 1 million people from their homes, killed tens of thousands of civilians, and still roam freely. UN Security Council resolution 1556 of 18 September 2004 enables the African Union to expand its force of about 450 observers and monitors into a more robust force of more than 3,000 soldiers. Nigeria has promised 1,000 to 1,500 troops towards the expanded mission.
However, at UN Security Council meeting on 24 September, Nigeria’s President and Chairman of the African Union, Olusegun Obasanjo, stressed that the African Union’s role in Darfur had strained all of its resources. President Obasanjo called on the Security Council to ensure that the Union had the capacity to maintain a force level of approximately 3,000 troops. Kofi Annan added that the unspeakable violence in the Darfur region was not simply an African problem, but one which concerned the entire international community, and emphasized that an expanded protective African Union presence required substantial international resources - logistics support, equipment and financing.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Africa will have to continue to take the lead with the ongoing peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives, and that ECOWAS Members will have a major role to play in this continental effort.

The Role of ECOWAS
The role of sub-regional organizations is clearly recognized in the AU, which has confirmed that the “Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union”. The Member States of the Economic Community of West African States are an integral part of both the African Union and the United Nations. Thus, in line with continental, regional, and sub-regional obligations, among the many important aspects of encouraging peace, harmony, and growth is the ECOWAS desire to design, build, and maintain a capability to encourage, control, and when necessary, enforce peace.

To stem the spread of insecurity in the sub-region, the ECOWAS leadership determined that an evolutionary process was required in order to meet the security needs of West Africa. Accordingly, the foundation charter was modified and the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was adopted in 1999. Incorporated into the Protocol were additional legal articles that were agreed to for the building of a collective military capability within the sub-region. The Protocol of 1999 is thus the foundation and core legal basis for the creation of a peace operations capability by ECOWAS.

Concept plans have already been drafted for the establishment of an ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) and implementation is proceeding apace. As with the AU, however, ECOWAS was not given the luxury of full implementation of the Mechanism before it had to act swiftly in response to complex emergencies in Côte d’Ivoire and in Liberia.

Since 19 September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire has been gripped by an internal conflict that has paralyzed the economy, split the political leadership, and illuminated the stark polarization of Ivorian society along ethnic, political, and religious lines. ECOWAS quickly recognized the gravity of the situation, touching as it did the economic heart of the region, and began mediation efforts within days of the initial uprising. In October 2002, ECOWAS mediators brokered a ceasefire, and both the Ivorian government and the main rebel group, the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) authorized an ECOWAS monitoring mission.

Working in conjunction with a small UN political and military liaison mission, and some 4,000 French troops, the 1,300-strong ECOWAS operation (ECOMICI) helped monitor compliance with the peace agreement between the Ivorian government and rebel forces. On 27 February 2004, the UN Security Council authorized a full peacekeeping operation for Côte d’Ivoire and mandated nearly 7,000 UN personnel to help implement the comprehensive peace agreement which was signed at Linas Marcoussis. On 5 April 2004, the ECOMICHI forces were subsumed under the UN flag as part of the UNOCI force.

To the west of Côte d’Ivoire, the renewal of war in Liberia in 1999 further undermined prospects for sustainable peace in the Mano River Union. As efforts continued to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone, hundreds of former

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4 PSC Protocol, Article 16 (1)
Fighters in Sierra Leone's civil war crossed into Liberia to fight as mercenaries either for the Liberian government or for the anti-government rebellions. ECOWAS soon engaged in diplomatic efforts to address the crisis. However, little international attention was given to the situation, until the LURD rebels reached the outskirts of Monrovia on 5 June 2003 and proceeded to sack the city.

Liberians were looking to the USA to intervene, but the Bush administration remained reluctant and an ECOWAS force consisting mainly of Nigerian troops had to take the lead (albeit with substantial American logistical support). The first contingent of Nigerians, a battalion redeployed from the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, arrived on 4 August 2003 and fighting in the capital came to an immediate halt. By 11 August, when Charles Taylor left, about 1,400 Nigerian troops were on the ground as the vanguard of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

On 18 August 2003, the Liberian parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra. By that Agreement, the parties requested the United Nations to deploy a force to Liberia to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. On 19 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 1509 (2003), authorizing a UN mission (UNMIL), consisting of up to 15,000 soldiers and up to 1,115 civilian police officers. The Council requested the Secretary-General to transfer authority from ECOMIL to UNMIL on 1 October.

UNMIL took over peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS forces on schedule. On 1 October last year, some 3,500 West African troops were “re-hatted” as UN peacekeepers, and the Secretary-General saluted ECOWAS for its role in establishing the security climate that paved the way for the deployment of UNMIL.

ECOWAS and UN initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are excellent examples of an emergent trend towards ‘hybrid operations’ in Africa. As was the case in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Burundi, these operations are characterised by an initial regional emergency response, sometimes backed by a powerful nation, and followed by the deployment of a multi-functional UN mission. In Sierra Leone, the British forces bolstered the UN mission when it was in crisis. In DRC, the French-led EU Operation Artemis deployed rapidly to avert further bloodshed in Bunia and the Ituri district. In Liberia the USA provided logistical support and an over-the-horizon backup force. In Côte d’Ivoire, the French Licorne Forces provided and continue to provide a credible backstop for regional and UN forces on the ground. Whatever we call these new kinds of engagement, their importance to the West African sub-region – and indeed to Africa - cannot be overstated.

Where Are We Now With Peace Operations?

By the 31 July 2004, there were 58,741 UN peacekeepers (troops, observers and police) from nearly one hundred countries deployed on 17 missions worldwide. 80% of these peacekeepers were deployed on the eight ongoing missions in Africa. And African countries provide 45% of this total. Ghana and Nigeria alone contribute nearly 7,000 peacekeepers to ongoing missions. Moreover, half the global numbers of peacekeepers are to be found in three large UN missions in West Africa (UNMIL, UNAMSIL, and UNOCI).

It is clear that there has not been a retrenchment in peace operations, as predicted in the New York Times seven years ago. Instead, Secretary-General Annan’s vision has been validated. Starting in 1999, there has been a renaissance in UN peace operations, and the emergence of increasingly relevant and critical roles for regional organizations.

The role of the UN with regard to conflicts in Africa is being reinforced in a very positive way. It focuses on a supportive role for the African regional mechanisms, which are taking the lead in dealing with conflicts in Africa - many of which cannot be handled at the regional level alone. We are no longer thinking in terms of either regional operations or UN operations to address our peacekeeping needs. It seems that we have outlived the days of a simple lean peacekeeping recipe for Africa. We are now talking about smart partnerships, authorized
by the Security Council, that involve regional forces as fire fighters (often with the support of a significant
power like the US, France or the UK) and which transition into full-blown UN multifunctional peacekeeping
and peacebuilding missions.

It is clear that West Africa remains at the epicentre of UN and regional peace operations. I can therefore think
of no more fitting venue for hosting this seminal event on the international peacekeeping calendar than the Kofi
Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, located here in Accra and overlooking the Gulf of Guinea.

**Conclusion: Training For Peace Operations**

While it remains that each new peace operation is different from its predecessors, best practices are being
identified, and some key lessons are being learned. The learning curve for peace-makers, strategists and mission
planners is becoming a steep one, and new structures, principles and doctrines are emerging at both the
international and regional levels. Much of this learning is being informed by real experiences at the operational
level – the level at which theories of peace implementation meet the harsh realities of the mission area.

The military have long been aware of the importance of a cycle that involves training that is based on doctrine
and tested in operations, with the lessons that emerge feeding back into new doctrinal and training
development. I have no doubt that this approach is now also being embraced by all the mission components
represented in this conference – military, police, and civilian practitioners and trainers.

Much has been said about the need for political will and sufficient logistics support if peace operations are to be
effective. However, in peace operations as in war-fighting, the human factor remains the critical determinant of
success. As Napoleon Bonaparte put it, the moral is to the material as ten is to one. The correct development of
human resources for peace operations is thus a critical success factor. It demands appropriate and relevant
training and education, based on real emergent needs.

The question you have set yourselves to address during this conference is simple, but profound – are we getting it
right?

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**2. Welcome – Brigadier General Charles Mankatah (Host)**

Many thanks to our distinguished guest of honour for laying out so clearly the context in which we must work
together. Although he focused on Africa and West Africa in particular, many elements are entirely relevant to
the peacekeeping and peace building communities at large.

My first task is to add my welcome to all of you as visitors to my country and guests at the KAIPTC. It is a great
delight to see so many friends and colleagues from around the world and I am particularly pleased that this year
there is a much greater participation by African institutions; I take this as an indication of increased
preparedness to work on improving our capacities.

Hosting this prestigious event is a great honour and it is also recognition of the growing maturity of our young
institution. When I spoke to you at Wertheim last year we had not run our first training event on the site. This
auditorium had yet to be completed as had many of the facilities that you will use this week.
Less than a year later I can stand here and tell you that the Centre is fully operational. It is still a work in progress and you will see that efforts continue to complete our accommodation and feeding facilities which will make the Centre a more cost effective and valuable asset to the region. However our training and education facilities are all but completed and we have already run more than 20 training and educational events with more than 1,000 participants passing though our doors. A vibrant and growing academic department has already produced much relevant and practical research output and we have strengthened our support to the UN and to ECOWAS. I think you will concede this is a not insignificant contribution in our first year.

None of this would have been possible without the support of many of the countries and institutions represented in this room today and I would wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge them amongst their peers. We much appreciate the engagement of those who we seek to serve; the institutions that mandate and conduct PSO. Both the UN staff and the ECOWAS secretariat have given us support and wise guidance so we may better serve them in the future.

As a new institution we have been particularly reliant on the assistance to our development given by our training and education partners. IAPTC and the opportunity to meet and learn from you all has been a very important part of that and underscores the need for this excellent forum. I must especially acknowledge our principal institutional partners:

- The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada and I am most pleased to welcome their President, Sandra Dunsmore, to KAIPTC for the first time;
- The Centre for International Peace Operations - better known as ZIF - from Berlin and I welcome - far from the first time - their Director Dr Winrich Kühne;
- The Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London, sadly not with us today;
- ACCORD, represented here by Kwezi Mngqibisa and Sam Siyaya;
- ISS, represented by Festus Aboagye; and
- Here in Accra our friends from LECIA, CDD, ASDR, FOSDA and WANEP.

The third group which deserve our thanks is our donors: the group of nations that has found the financial, human and material resources to turn this vision into a reality. The governments of Canada, France, Germany, Ghana, Italy, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom and the United States have been indispensable and unfailing in their efforts and we hope others will move to join them in the future. In that context I would like to pay particular tribute to the government of Japan and the Japan International Co-operation Agency who have been generous enough to subsidise the IAPTC AGM this week.

I am not going to go into the substance of our conference plans; I shall leave that to the IAPTC President who will speak next. What I would like to do though is to offer some brief thoughts on the issue of training co-ordination and harmonisation. I will not steal the thunder of others speaking later in the week. However I will say that our own experience here has shown that we must all make a greater effort to look outside our own immediate concerns and to see how we can best link up with others. Within the PSO training and education community there are a variety of different roles and specialisations. Do we all really know who else is already out there and what they are doing? If we do not, how can we judge the relevance and importance of the competing demands on our finite resources?

This issue was discussed during the annual meeting of APSTA, the African Peace Support Trainers Association which took place here last Thursday and Friday. As a result we adopted a series of projects to undertake during the coming year which we hope will result in the production of a comprehensive matrix that maps PSO training and education needs in Africa against the current provision of activities. Such a matrix ought to be of considerable value to users and providers alike.
Africa remains the only region within the IAPTC which has taken up the suggestion of forming a regional forum and since its formation APSTA has sent an annual message to the main IAPTC conference. It seems to us that this year we should underscore the very real value that we have found in APSTA as a vehicle for more clearly identifying the potential for co-operative and complementary activities between institutions. The development of a needs/activity matrix would seem to be equally relevant to any of the other regions and we hope others may take such initiatives. That would be considerably easier if it were developed under the auspices of regional geographical groupings within IAPTC and we would commend reconsideration of such an approach elsewhere.

Finally, whilst recognising that our principal reason for coming together here is for professional development, I would underline the importance of our social interaction; that is the glue that binds us together as colleagues. Ghana has a well deserved reputation for hospitality and we will do all that we can to provide an atmosphere and environment that will encourage you to play at least as hard as you work. Please call upon any of the KAIPTC staff at any time for any support or assistance and we will do our very best to help. In that respect I would like to identify to those of you who have not already met them our IAPTC project team: Cdr Phil Harris, Ms Jodi Rosenstein and Ms Kakra Ayensu. During working hours one of them will always be found in the IAPTC office which is in the conference centre; the next building across the road from here.

It is now my pleasant duty to introduce our final speaker at this opening ceremony. That of course is the President of the IAPTC Polizeidirektor Günther Freisleben from the Baden-Württemberg Police College in Wertheim, hosts to the IAPTC AGM in 2003. Günther I could try and say herzlich wilkommen or I could just say Akwaaba. Either way it means you are most welcome here and I have to say you are looking far more at ease this year in Accra than you did last year in Wertheim – and I now understand why!

Ladies and Gentlemen, our president Günther Freisleben.

3. Speech of the President of the IAPTC, Colonel Günther Freisleben

First of all I would like to express that I’m deeply impressed by this wonderful welcome – I think we all feel now the rhythm and the hospitality of the people of Ghana; thank you very much for this. Please allow me first to give a short reply to the introduction by Brigadier Mankatah. Dear Charles, you mentioned that you understand now why I’m looking far more at ease here than in Wertheim. You’re right; it’s much easier to be President than to be the host. But I’m sure after this week you and your team will have an unforgettable feeling of having done something great. Thank you very much.

Distinguished guests of honour, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear peacekeepers from all over the world being present here today at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana.

It’s a special honour and I’m personally convinced that the handover of the Presidency from a German President to a Ghanaian is a clear signal for the very good relationship between Ghana and Germany. The inauguration of this auditorium, where we’re celebrating now the opening ceremony, took place end of January 2004. Concerning the support given by the German Government this hall is named after the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who personally was present at the inauguration.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I’m going to emphasize two topics: firstly 10 years of IAPTC, and secondly, the theme
of our annual meeting this year “Training for Peace Operations: Are we meeting the need?”

10 years of IAPTC
With this conference we’re celebrating our 10th anniversary as well. And you all know that our living association is closely linked to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia, Canada, and of course to the people working for this institution. You can find more about the aforementioned link and about the history of IAPTC on the internet.

For me as President, and I’m convinced that I say that on behalf of all members of the IAPTC, this anniversary is a good and grateful opportunity to say “Thank you, Pearson”. As a successor of Mr. Pearson, I also would like to welcome the President of the PPC, Mrs. Sandra Dunsmore. Sandra, thank you very much for what your entire centre has done in the past, continues to do, and will do in the future.

In this context I will also say thank you to two persons. First of all the ladies. Thank you very much Ms Stephanie Blair, as one of the co-founders and first Director of the IAPTC Secretariat ten years ago, and thank you, Mr. David Lightburn as Secretary. I’m not going deeply in the history of IAPTC, but I would like to remind you of the hosting countries:

- 1995 - Canada
- 1996 - Norway
- 1997 - Italy
- 1998 - Malta
- 1999 - Canada
- 2000 - South Africa
- 2001 - Japan
- 2002 - Argentina
- 2003 - Germany
- 2004 - Ghana

In 2005 we will be hosted by India. After this short review, I want to go towards to our theme:

Are we meeting the need?
Ladies and Gentlemen, as you can see, I’m serving at the moment in Bosnia-Herzegovina as member of the European Union Police Mission in the function as Chief Advisor to the Republica Srpska. One of the reasons was that I’m kindly inviting my trainers and instructors to serve in missions abroad, because a trainer should know what he or she is talking about. And then my trainers asked me, and what’s about you?

Serving abroad is a need, because each trainer and instructor should have firstly their own experience and secondly always quite new experience. For sure you’re asking now, is the difference between "own experience" and "always quite new experience" really that important. Yes, it is. One of the trainers came back from Bosnia in March this year. At the same time the new Commissioner started and the EUPM changed to a programme orientated mission. That means, we at the Police College Wertheim trained German Police Officers for the old mission - I would like to highlight only for a certain time. In the meantime we changed some of our training modules.

But why this example? I think, we all are trying to meet the need, but we’ll never reach 100% - that’s similar to the work of Sysiphos. Exactly this is the point. IAPTC and this conference should help, support or back up all Training Centres to reach nearly 100% of the need.

Therefore, I’m looking forward to the outcome of this conference.
May I give some questions to you for further discussions?

- Is it possible to give a clear definition of each mission's need?
- Are we able to train our personnel in exactly this regard?
- How can we improve our rate of "meeting the need"?

Thank you very much for your attention.
4. Keynote Speech given by Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai5: ‘Training For Peace Support Operations: Are We Getting It Right?’

It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to address this gathering of stakeholders of global peace seekers. As a practitioner of peacekeeping, I am very much at home in your midst as I believe we share a vision and purposeful obligation in the quest for global peace and security. I was here in Accra a few days ago at the invitation of the International Peace Academy to appraise efforts to improve conflict management in West Africa and I discussed factors required for returning Sierra Leone to political and military normalcy. At that gathering a recurring index was the issue of training.

Today, I am here to address you distinguish ladies and gentlemen on training for peace support operations (PSO). Let me first of all thank the organizers, International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) for holding this conference and for inviting me to share some of my thoughts with you. I hope at the end the set objective of this Conference will be achieved.

Any organization worthy of its salt must ensure adequate training and through training the development of its personnel. There is no substitute for training, which is the bed-rock of all activities especially in the military. It is also an essential investment in human resources and can never be wasted. The United Nations (UN) over the years has evolved series of activities and innovative ideas in ensuring that all Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to its missions attain a certain level of proficiency and experience. African countries are not spared on the issue of standards irrespective of level of political and economic development. In line with this, the Standardized Training Module 3 was conducted in this same institution some couple of days ago. It is a move in the right direction with great benefits to African countries in particular and all others in the performance of PSG. The Brahimi’s report has added a new dimension to this issue in the wake of its call to encourage regional security arrangements as a basis for ensuring global peace and security.

The report also advocated for the deployment of well trained and robustly equipped personnel in peace missions, which is a serious challenge to all involved in PSG more so the African Union (AU). The AU despite a series of limitations has on 25 May 2004 launched the Peace and Security Council to fasten its response to security issues in the continent. There are also indications that in the not too far distance Africa shall establish a Rapid Response Brigade(s) or Standby Force Arrangement either at the regional or sub-regional level. These definitely are ventures that require well trained personnel if the whole issue will not be a pipeline dream. The training required will cover activities from the strategic to the tactical level. This therefore leads me to the theme of this seminar, which is on training for peace support operations and the question of whether or not we are doing it right.

Over the years, PSO has become multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary and multi-institutional. It includes peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace making, peace building and humanitarian activities. Although the principles are similar and in some instances the same, however, each one has a unique principle which may not be applicable to the others. Furthermore, each mission is essentially different from the others; couple with the diverse interests of all the stakeholders including NGOs. It becomes mandatory for us, especially the military and civilian police to train our personnel for the task they are to undertake. This is more so now that the world has become a global village; activities of peacekeepers are being flashed across the world within seconds of occurrence.

5 Chief of Army Staff, Nigeria
Participants in PSO on the military side could be divided into 3 main categories. These are peacekeepers, military observers and staff officers to include the planning elements. Apart from the requisite individual training, each group require essential training that could be handled through pre-induction, unit, middle cadre, train-the-trainer courses and vide the strategic level training. For peacekeepers in particular, it is essential for the troops to be mentally, militarily and psychologically equipped having a robust mandate which will help them to always send a clear message to the warring factions or any combatants in their mission area that they are ready, willing and capable of defending themselves and their mandate.

We all know that it is not only military personnel that are involved in PSO as civil police and civilians are also involved in the command and control of peacemaking, peace building and more importantly humanitarian operations. The police on their part are close to the military in their activities. They assist in law enforcement duties and training of the host nations' civil police. Civilians including UN staff and NGOs provide capacity building and training to the nation where the mission is taking place. They are also responsible for streamlining peacekeepers activities. If all those involved in PSG are properly trained in their field which may vary, they will complement themselves. This invariably will result in a high degree of cooperation, thereby enhancing the achievement of the mission's mandate quickly and easily.

However, from my experience, training by forces of TCCs is diverse, depending on the challenge perception by the military and political will of the respective governments. In joint and multi-national operations typical of PSG, these are real and contending issues. To compound the problem, there are basic differences in doctrine, capacity and capability of those involved. If the regional security arrangement being emphasized and emplaced is to stand the test of time, there is the need to critically examine the training of the TCC and all those involve in PSO.

The present arrangement for training the above enumerated categories of military men in PSO is inadequate both at the various national and continental levels. Furthermore, in ECOWAS sub-region the contributions of TCCs are hardly examined before allotting slots for their training at the tactical and operational levels in Mali and Ghana respectively. We cannot talk of the strategic level training in Nigeria because that has not even started. The officers' training could be excused because of their exposure to series of courses as their middle cadre courses at institutions like the Staff College that involve PSO packages. My problem is with the training of the huge number of soldiers who have direct and day-to-day contact with the locals in a mission area. They are the ones on patrols, road blocks, check points and any crowd control. The problems they face are better imagined if one realized that their primary training has prepared them to shoot to kill. Paradoxically, they are now expected to be tolerant in the face of serious provocations, which might be verbal or physical insults.

This was one of the factors that influenced my decision in Nigeria to establish the Nigerian Army Training Centre and the Peacekeeping Wing. The present arrangement is to allow personnel of any unit earmarked for PSO to be prepared for the challenges ahead, which include; psychological, level of tolerance, international laws, ethics and human rights issues. Furthermore, it will allow for proper marrying up of various elements from elsewhere, afford them the opportunity to have personal contact and know themselves better before induction into the mission area. They will have ample opportunity of training appropriately for 6 weeks on equipment including new ones that would be required in their operation.

There is the need as a start for PSO doctrine to be standardized and SOPs of member states harmonized in line with the UN standard to enhance capabilities in the African region. This is more so with the envisaged establishment of the Africa Standby Force Arrangement, which will go a long way in reducing the ensuing confusion during operation. Of immediate importance is the harmonization of civil police training for PSO, as the roles and configuration of the Police differ from country to country. The training capabilities require serious improvement at the national and regional levels. Training slots at all levels; tactical, operational and strategic
must be increased laterally, upwardly and focused more on train-the-trainer arrangements to be conducted at specially designated centres of excellence to optimize resources. Furthermore, external joint field training assistance need to focus on pre-deployment training of units earmarked for specific missions.

It goes without saying that most African countries do not have the wherewithal and can not undertake most of the training required on their own without outside assistance. It is glaring that most can not provide the basic training materials not to mention updating the contingent equipment. With well organized programmes most of these issues could be overcome with assistance from donor nations and the UN. A very serious problem facing poor nations is that of logistic support for their personnel. Assisting them with equipment and essential logistics requirement should not be seen as the ultimate assistance to such nations, because these countries lack the capability to repair and maintain such equipment. It is important to provide repairs and maintenance training to receiving countries while providing/donating equipment to them.

It is also important for regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADC to horizontally and vertically cooperate with other regional and international bodies like the AU and the UN. Irrespective of the amount of training that has taken place, there will always be visible disadvantages whenever there is a shortfall or inability to react to an emerging crisis situation. The envisaged cooperation and interoperability of the forces will give an international blend to the deployment of peacekeepers from the different regions. When there is an urgent need for action and delay is evident, the cooperation between a regional body and the UN will allow for an immediate deployment of peacekeepers from the region as was the case with ECOMOG in the 1990's in Liberia and Sierra Leone and ECOMIL in 2003 in Liberia. They will reduce if not completely prevent wanton destruction of lives and properties and assist in ensuring peace and security, by limiting migration of the crisis to other countries.

Problems of note are the differences and complexities in background, culture, tradition, attitude and environment of where the peacekeepers are coming from. This has a great influence in the behaviour and expectations of those involved. Stakeholders from advanced economies need to understand the peculiar nature of others from developing nations. This is the reason why more joint training and exercises will be required by all those involved in PSO even if there is no mission. It will provide and assist those involved in PSO to know the diverse nature of their fellow peacekeepers and the possible environment in which they may operate.

An emerging concern which required immediate attention is the issue of peacekeepers going home to their countries to create instability as was the case in Guinea Bissau, Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire. This may be a new challenge that will require a concerted effort in the training of new TCCs is they are inducted into a mission. The training should have a focused outlook to enable the troops to see themselves as part of the global efforts for peace, rather than turning their experience against constituted authorities in their home country.

In conclusion, it is necessary for all stakeholders to come together to harmonized their training and test it through joint exercises and field training. Any assistance to less endowed TCCs to enhance their capability should also include capacity building. There should be periodic conferences and workshops to exchange ideas and examine lessons learnt. This surely is the path to a better understanding of what PSO is all about especially here in Africa where I see for the next decade there will be conflicts that will need to be resolved.
Session II Information Session

Moderator: Colonel Vidar Falck (Norway)

1. Best Practices Unit Presentation - Mr David Harland (UN DPKO)

Everybody involved in Peacekeeping missions are professionally deficient in some way. For example there are SRSGs who interfere with the chain of command; force commanders who will not develop or cannot plan a joined-up campaign; staff officers who cannot set up joint operation centres; contingent commanders who do not know the code of conduct and do not hold their troops to it, and who do not know any tactical options beyond patrolling and guarding fixed points; and those who will not obey force commanders and have ideological arguments about Chapter 6 missions versus Chapter 7 missions.

The need for effective peacekeeping is not being met. This is more the fault of the UN than the descending states. One of the main problems is that there are no established positions, policies or doctrines with respect to activities such as setting up joint operations or campaign plans. Although DPKO does not train peacekeepers the department still feels the need to address this “total lack of guidance in the UN peacekeeping system.” This is why STM3 is so important - it literally was started in a void.

What is guidance?

A working definition of guidance is: “the internal policies, procedures, instructions or guidelines of an organization, which provide suggested, recommended or compulsory courses of action for given issues or activities.” Guidance therefore means the superset of various guidance materials. The term ‘guidance’ is used here because of the strong reactions which the phrases doctrine and policy can have due to people’s preconceptions. Having observed the US Army, the World Bank and NGOs, such as Oxfam, it is clear that these organisations have far more structure than the UN - even NGOs can say where their jobs come from.

Why is guidance needed?

If guidance can be improved there will be less need for continuous reinvention. Putting guiding structures in place will also reduce staff turnover, improve continuity of management and provide an agreed common approach and language for peacekeepers. This will increase efficiency and effectiveness. Another repercussion of improved guidance will also be greater accountability. At the moment there is little accountability in the UN system in the field. There are thus no clear performance indicators. By setting performance standards for monitoring and evaluation it will be easier to assess performance. There will also be greater capacity to attribute responsibility and accountability. In turn this may bring increased safety both for the peacekeepers and for the civilians.

It is important to note that there are excellent practices already established within the DPKO. It is, however, also important to create a departmental system so that conceptual issues and systems and processes can be clarified.

Terminology

The problem with many of the concepts used in peacekeeping is that the terminology is unclear. Of the 191 countries involved in DPKO each have their own terminology, which especially when translated, can have “a slippery range of meanings”. In order to solve the confusion on terminology, definitions must be clarified. These terms however, should not be too narrow and must be broad enough to meet the diverse needs of UN peacekeeping. This clarification would not be an ideological debate, so some terms, such as “peace building”, would be only loosely defined.
Hopefully by reducing everything to three levels of guidance the technical and less prescriptive forms of guidance could be accommodated. The three levels would be broad principles, guidelines and standard operating procedures. Guidelines would be based on past experience and would provide a starting point from which to work.

It is important not to over prescribe. An amusing example is provided by the US Army which has a website with ‘How to use toilet paper and what to do when you’re done with it’. Often the degree of prescription needed mirrors the level of task repetitiveness. In the case of a civil affairs liaison there must be a low level of prescription. Although it is a prescribed principle that they must have contact with the host community, how the job is done is decided in the context of the mission. In contrast, in DDR a higher level of guidance must be given, for example rules such as ‘do not give money to child soldiers’ are put in place. At the highest level are SOPs which dictate important procedures such as equipment testing. If SOPs are not followed then disciplinary action may follow.

**Hierarchy of Guidance**

In the classical model of guidance hierarchy there are three levels: strategic, operational and technical. This translates in business terms as the philosophy, the organisational policies and the administrative rules and regulations. This rigid demarcation of levels is impossible in a fragmented system such as UN peacekeeping. An approximation of this could and should be achieved. Currently there are several levels of guidance within the UN, some of which are rigid and binding and some of which are flexible and optional.

The first step in developing DPKO guidance is to separate out superior guidance and assemble a concept of how our operational guidance should be formed. The Brahimi Report and C-34 Report are examples of strategic guidance. Once the strategic guidance has been assembled and formulated into a coherent whole, the operational and functional guidance can be extracted from it.

Doctrine is still an issue for member states who donate troops to peacekeeping missions. This project would not stop member states from prohibiting any action. The goal however, is to improve the structure of policy and once this is achieved it is more likely that states will be confident in, and trust UNDPKO to make decisions. Once the two conceptual issues, of terminology and hierarchy of guidance, have been clarified the problem of formulating policy can be addressed.

**Policy**

Within DPKO there is no standard method for writing policy or for transmitting it to the field. This is a problem which is being addressed; DPKO is going to develop templates and drafting instructions for creating policy and make it SOP. Even once a policy is written the problems do not end. It needs to be clarified who is the authority for policy and who is responsible for policy. For example, who ensures guidance is followed? A possible solution to this is an inventory which tracks guidance. This framework would clarify DPKO activities and guidance requirements, assign responsibility, track the status, and improve accessibility to guidance.

**Linking Policy to Practice**

A strategy is being developed to link field practice to guidance. It is part of separate work led by PBPU to design best practice tools for missions and HQs. It is important because there must be a feedback loop from field practice into guidance formulation and revision. By using the ISO standards to formulate the DDR process it prevents the guidance from being UN or DPKO specific and increases the effectiveness. This is however still in the trial stage.
Implementation

There are various implementation options which are being explored including a strong, medium or light central management structure or outsourcing. In the first instance the Policy office would state what the SOPs are on the basis of a study. In the second instance a policy unit would keep a depository of all databases and would ensure that everything was compatible. Lastly DPKO could merely dictate the template of policy and ensure that functions follow such as with large NGOs. The method chosen depends on various factors including resources, costs, sustainability and risk. The first option is perhaps the least practical. Before implementation there must be consultations with HQs and missions, ongoing field work to identify best practices, testing of hypothesis, product design submitted to SMT and then a sequential roll out of products.

Summary

- Clear concepts must be established. A working and comprehensible set of terms and definitions must be decided upon. A hierarchy of guidance should be created.
- A system must be implemented which develops, tracks and manages guidance. This system must also be linked to field practitioners so that their experience can be incorporated into policy.
- Constraints: There are many operational demands on peacekeepers already. Although many of the missions consulted like the project, they are too busy to implement or sustain it.
- There is concern that the project might over-prescribe and be bureaucratic. This outlook is linked to the presiding culture in the field, which is highly entrepreneurial. Often peacekeepers are forced to improvise. Some enjoy this more relaxed mode of working and are thus possibly passively resistant to more restrictions and guidance.
- The project must be connected to other things going on in the department such as the DCM portal project.
- What is needed is constructive engagement to test the hypothesis and help to design solutions, top-down SMT support and an informal steering group.

2. UN Training Update - Lieutenant Colonel Vasant Mande (UN DPKO TES)

TES is a military section of DPKO which is comprised of 15 military officers who serve between three to four years and four permanent staff. Its mission is to provide standardized peacekeeping training guidance to member states.

The Brahimi Report recommended that DPKO developed standardized peacekeeping training guidance. At the 2001 Tokyo IAPTC the lack of standardized training was raised. This resulted in the STM (Standardized Training Module) project which was planned as three levels over three years. Level 1, the basic level for peacekeepers, began in 2002. It is now completed and is used extensively in a number of pre-deployment courses, mission training, specialist course and peacekeeping exercises worldwide. It is also available on the website. Level 2 modules are for middle ranking military and civilian police officers. This level has not yet been completed however field tests on the HQ staff for the new missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Haiti and Burundi have shown good results. A Level 2 seminar for officers was held in Slovakia in May 2004. Level 3 is aimed at senior mission management, B5 and above including SRSGs. The second seminar for this Level was conducted Accra in October 2004 and the Module should be finalised by April 2005. 75 member states contribute to the development process.

TES not only provides training but they also publish peacekeeping training materials. So far it is responsible for 29 publications. It develops standardized peacekeeping training materials, supports peacekeeping operations and provides training support for member states.
Aims
TES supports the ongoing DPKO project aimed at enhancing African capacity for peacekeeping training as well as focusing on emerging TCCs. There are ‘training the trainer’ courses in Namibia, Zambia, Kenya, Senegal and Mali. It is anticipated that there will be 6-10 such courses conducted every year. Once STM 1, 2 and 3 become operational they can be honed to aim to the peacekeeping worldwide standards. If the courses are taught in international peacekeeping centres and meet UN standards, they then become UN recognised STMs and accordingly participants can be sponsored. So far 21 peacekeeping training centres are using the system to UN standards, although courses have been taught at 30 centres.

Relationships
Close coordination and integration with both external and internal bodies is necessary in order to develop the courses. Those consulted include:
External: Member states, UNITAR POCI, NATO TEPSO manuals, AU and ECOWAS, US SOUTHCOM and PACOM National and International training institutions, and
Internal: Training and Advisory Group, DPKO, Training and Evaluation Service, Civilian training Service Section, Training Section, Civilian police Division, MTCs, and IMTCs.

3. OSCE Update - Mr Thomas Neufing

Background on OSCE
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating states have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

There are currently 18 missions all operating in a purely civic function. Although OSCE has considered peacekeeping, it focuses instead on peacebuilding functions. There are experts situated in south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Lessons Learnt from Kosovo
Many harsh lessons have been learnt from OSCE’s experience in Kosovo. As a result OSCE realised it does not have the capability for large missions. It also implemented new structures to increase pre-mission training. To improve the training there have been meetings with all states, missions and training centres, in order to exchange profiles on realities in the field and other ideas. In comparison to the military experts it is clear that civilian experts do not receive nearly enough training. One third of OSCE’s civilian trainers arrive without any prior training. This creates a security risk and raises duty of care issues. An example given is where civilians are deployed to a previously volatile, but currently secure area, and the situation suddenly changes, as was the case in the recent riots in Kosovo. The civilians were neither ready nor able to deal with the situation.

Training
It is essential that civilians have field orientation. However, the details of this training are not clear: What are the right subjects and methods? Who are the right trainers? And to what extent is it possible to train social and intercultural competence? It is also important that civilians learn to cooperate and work with the military and police, who have very different operational cultures. One possible solution to overcoming the mutual communication barriers is to have the military and police as trainers on issues such as crime protection, security
and CIMIC. The issue of security is also an important one because more civilians die in peace operations than soldiers. Training on four wheel driving, mine awareness, snipers, hostage taking, road blocks and how to handle a criminal assault would address some of the security concerns.

The selection of participants is an issue which arises before the training even begins. Questions about the prospective participants’ previous working experience, age, gender, social and intercultural competence must all be addressed. There is thus an indispensable link between training, recruitment, deployment, assessment and field performance.

OSCE issued training standards to member states for guidance on training those participants who were sent to the annual meeting in Vienna; this drastically simplified the staffing matrix.

4. UN OHCHR Update - Ms Francesca Marotta

OHCHR aims towards enhancing the human rights preparedness of peace operations personnel by strengthening the capacity of member states and the UN to provide human rights training to civilian personnel, police, and military peacekeepers. This objective is part of a broader effort to improve the integration of human rights into UN peacekeeping and security operations. Many of the harsh lessons that have been learnt in the host country are now implicit in mission mandates. Thus, peacekeeping personnel need to be aware and know how to contribute within their own functions and own specific mandates. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi report was to focus on this.

By improving the training and materials available to peacekeepers they become more aware of the issues surrounding human rights. OHCHR aims to develop training manuals with DPKO and develop more specialized materials for police and civilian personnel. It also aims to provide training to military and police trainers from national peacekeeping training centres and institutions. OHCHR will also provide training to human rights field personnel. Another way of improving awareness is by OHCHR participating in DPKO and member states training activities and by them providing induction training for deployed personnel.

The Specialized Training Package on Human Rights for Military Personnel of Peace Operations is for both observers and armed contingents (chapter 6 and chapter 7). It is a tool to facilitate an introduction to human rights into national training for military personnel. It will equip military peacekeepers with the knowledge, skills and attitude necessary to make them active players in promoting and protecting human rights in keeping with the mission mandate. This package is not just about increasing human rights awareness, but it is also about exploring the roles that military peacekeepers can perform. Again this incorporates many of the harsh lessons learnt in the missions. It is not just training on how peacekeepers should conduct themselves, but more importantly it is method to promote their active contribution.

The approach taken is audience-specific, function-orientated and practical. It develops not just knowledge but skills and attitudes so peacekeepers can see themselves as part of the human rights solution. It emphasises the importance of coordination and cooperation and is scenario-based. In these scenarios case studies and previous good examples of good human rights practices are used. Peacekeepers, civilians and military experts with field experience were involved throughout the development of the package to ensure the relevance of the training.

In addition to examining human rights and the roles of peacekeepers, the training addresses protection issues (physical protection of civilians by peacekeepers) as well as monitoring and reporting on human rights violation. It also examined situations where peacekeepers are called to perform law enforcement functions (usually because of lack of local capacity), and civilian-military relations. The peacekeepers interaction with local military is also considered together with thematic models such as: women, refugees, and children.
This package is designed to be used by trainers of military personnel of peace operations. It is primarily for military trainers at officers’ level from national peacekeeping centres or relevant training programmes in national military forces, military trainers in missions and civilian trainers, such as OHCHR personnel. It must be noted that this is a work-in-progress. The first pilot was conducted in Buenos Aires at CACOPAEZ.

5. **Challenges Project - Ms Annika Hilding Norberg (Folke Bernadotte Academy)***

The objective of Challenges of Peace Operations is to foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership, and to make practical recommendations that will benefit the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational and multidisciplinary peace operations. Successful peacekeeping operations depend on many factors; however participation by member states is crucial. Therefore the partner organisations have decided to focus on this aspect.

The Phase 1 concluding report on the project from 1997 -2002 made recommendations to troop-contributing countries and contributed to ongoing UN reform on peacekeeping operations. It also informed on current peace operation developments.

The second phase (from 2002-2005) is attempting to answer the question: How can multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural cooperation coordination at strategic, operational and tactical levels be improved? The recommendations will address the questions: how can governments, with differing resources and capabilities best respond? And what might be the most helpful ways in which member states could support UN peace keeping operations? The Phase 2 concluding report is planned to be presented to the UN SG and Ministers of Partners in mid-2005.

Sub-themes which are being developed are: the regional dynamic and the relationship between the UN and regional organisations and member states. Also of interest is the rule of law and transitional justice issue, and the preparations for peace operations through education and training.

In analysing training and education it is important to assess whether the needs are being met. Challenges have focused on the regional dimension of capacity building and cooperation for preparation of individuals for peace operations. There have been several seminars on these topics. The last seminar was held at the Nigerian War College in June, 2004 and the next (the 15th) in China in November, 2004.

The results and products of the Challenges Project so far have been: a concluding report from the focused seminars; input to the UN; contributions to academic and diplomatic journals; and increased knowledge about peace operations in the field in the official languages of the UN. An example of members taking the initiative to report to the UN occurred after the Tokyo seminar when the report became a chapter in the Secretary-General’s Annual report. The cooperation and exchanges between partner countries have contributed to projects such as the Early Warning Programme for Africa.

If the need for training for peace operations is not being met then it must be examined as to how, through cooperation and coordination, training can be improved to meet the challenges of the future.

6. **JICA Brief - Ms Naoka Imoto***

**History**

Japan is a newcomer to the area of peacekeeping, however has been committed to peacebuilding and development assistance for the last half-century. Japan’s ODA is used in three ways: bi-lateral grants, bi-lateral
loans and grants for multilateral organisations such as the UN. The bilateral grants are handled by Embassies of Japan with the technical cooperation being carried out exclusively by JICA. The new president of JICA has indicated a major focus on Africa with respect to their activities.

Although the Japanese constitution limits the size of the defence force, it has expanded as the definition of ‘force’ has changed. Consequentially, Japan has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations. Since the 1990s, Japan has participated in eight peacekeeping operations, three humanitarian assistance operations and five electoral assistance operations. Japan has also been involved in a diplomatic mode in the conflicts in Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. This change in ODA policy is a result of the 1992 Charter stressing the need for Japan to play a vigorous role in peacebuilding. Japan hosted the G8 Miyazaki initiative for conflict prevention in 2000.

**JICA’s involvement in Development and Peacebuilding**

Since becoming involved in peacebuilding, JICA has dispatched 360 Japanese personnel to Afghanistan, and invited 68 Afghans to Japan for training to cite some examples of their efforts. Peacebuilding for JICA is a general approach extending from conflict prevention to reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, in which peace is pursued through the board endeavours that include development assistance in addition to traditional efforts within a military and political framework. The military framework includes preventative diplomacy, disarmament and mediation. In recent years, there has been a new emphasis placed in the role of development assistance in the context of peacebuilding. JICA's activities are entirely based within this context.

JICA has primarily been involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities in countries including Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. Although JICA is mainly active in post-conflict situations, it recently sent staff to Sri Lanka, Mindanao (Philippines) and Aceh (Indonesia) in the transition period between cease fire and reconciliation.

JICA’s peacebuilding activities are based on seven pillars: reconciliation, governance, security improvement, rehabilitation of social infrastructure, economic recovery, support for the socially vulnerable, and humanitarian emergency relief. An example of reconciliation occurred in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan where JICA promoted repatriation of refugees and IDPs. By sending three personnel to aid the recent democratic elections in Afghanistan JICA was supporting the principle of governance. JICA has also worked to promote judicial systems and human resource development of civil servants of conflict effected states. JICA has contributed to security improvement by supporting DDR programmes and is considering greater involvement in this area. To improve security JICA has trained relevant workers from Cambodia, East Timor, and other countries on issues relating to public order, including police administration and policy reform. The involvement in the rehabilitation of social infrastructure has been demonstrated by support given to demining projects and the provision of urgent rehabilitation support. An example is the building of schools in Afghanistan; and a humanitarian emergency relief project in East Timor, where the quick impact project entailed rehabilitation of the water supply system. JICA economic recovery support is done by way of providing training on economic policy and the rehabilitation of economic infrastructure. Support for the socially vulnerable has been provided in the Republic of Srpska by a joint programme with CIDA which aims to improve community based rehabilitation.

Since broadening JICA’s remit there has been a shortage in personnel, knowledge and skills in peacekeeping. Through staff training, expert training, improvement in human resources data and linking with outside training centres, JICA is working on human resource development.

JICA acknowledges the constraints upon it and works in cooperation with a diverse combination of actors. These actors include NGOS, the UN, study groups, advisory groups, the government and consultant
companies. It is necessary for JICA to re-examine its overall approach to peacebuilding assistance in order to be more flexible, and to develop a comprehensive framework for peacebuilding cooperation.
Moderator- Ms Sandra Dunsmore (PPC)
It is important to remember the purpose of peacekeeping and peacebuilding: to create a potential for a constructive change and ensure a way to lasting peace. It is therefore important that organisations understand each others roles in the context of the mission. That is one of the biggest advantages of training in a multidisciplinary setting.

1. The Training and Education Need From a Military Perspective - Brigadier General J N Adinkrah (Ghana)

Introduction
The following is based mainly on the personal experiences of Brigadier Adinkrah and his service with various peacekeeping missions from the level of a Platoon Commander to that of a Military Observer, Battalion Commander and finally as a Sector Commander.

There are two facts about the military that are axiomatic and universally acknowledged. The first is that education and training are acknowledged to be the cornerstones of readiness.  Education differs from training because it develops analytical skills and therefore has a longer lasting effect, whereas training sharpens functional skills. This usually takes a relatively shorter time but needs constant repetition to be maintained. In any professional army therefore, both training and education are essential pre-requisites otherwise there may be fatal consequences.

Secondly, the military exists primarily for national defence. In the case of the Ghana Armed Forces, the national Constitution mandates the military to protect the territorial integrity of the nation, assist the civil authority to maintain internal security and to be prepared to contribute troops for international peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the Ghana Armed Forces has been in the business of peacekeeping since 1960, commencing only three years after attaining independence from the British. The relative success of the Ghana Armed Forces in its international peacekeeping operations has probably been due largely to the careful attention paid to education and training.

Before the end of the Cold War, global peacekeeping operations were fairly straightforward and were normally carried out with the full consent of the parties concerned, on the basis of impartiality and non-use of force except self-defence. This was the situation when I embarked on my first peacekeeping mission in 1975 as a Platoon Commander with UNEF II in Egypt. The force was charged with supervising the disengagement of forces and forming a buffer zone between the opposing forces - Egypt and Israel. Our job was mainly conducting patrols and monitoring and reporting on the activities of the two countries.

However, since the end of the Cold War, the climate of peacekeeping has changed dramatically. Ethnicity and nationality have replaced ideology and the East-West rivalries. Now that, ‘Cold War stability’ has disintegrated and state-of-the-art weaponry is available and abundant, the problem of global security is exacerbated. Meanwhile, public pressure to deploy peacekeeping troops has increased as information has become more accessible via the internet and media. Finally, there is now greater co-operation within the UN Security Council which results in more involvement in global conflict resolution.

Impact on Operations
The range of peacekeeping operations has thus expanded from traditional peacekeeping to peacemaking, preventative diplomacy, peace building and peace enforcement. This change is demonstrated by the difference between the situation in 1994 in UNAMIR and UNEF. In UNAMIR, the traditional buffer zone was no longer present. As in UNIFIL and ECOMOG, troops lived in the same operational area with the warring factions. These factions were predominantly made up of nervous, usually untrained, trigger-happy militias and boy-soldiers who had no qualms about ambushing ambulances or harassing, kidnapping and killing unarmed peacekeepers. In these operations there is no peace to keep and therefore the enabling operational condition has to be created. Additionally such operations tend to involve several components such as CIVPOL, UN Volunteers, International NGOs and civil administrators. Each of these groups has overlapping and cross-cutting areas of interest.

**Challenges in Training for War and Training for Peacekeeping Operations**

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it" - Dag Hammarskjold

This statement captures the greatest dilemma confronting military planners and soldiers alike. From the time of recruitment a soldier is trained for war-fighting. Military personnel are used to the doctrine of “fight and win”. Therefore they find it difficult to adapt to the drawn out, slow and sometimes indecisive process of peacekeeping, where consensus rather than decisive victory is the goal.

In war there is an identifiable enemy to engage with, while in peacekeeping the belligerents often do not conform to the traditional form of ‘enemy’. Often the belligerents are simply wayward elements indulging in violence. Hence, police doctrine rather than military doctrine is more appropriate and useful because the objective is peace and not the subjugation of an opponent. This solution however, can provide problems. For example, in the contemporary security environment well-armed groups ruled by warlords use peacekeepers for ‘target practice’ and the peacekeepers are constrained to react only in self-defence. The challenge therefore is how to consciously eschew aggression and adopt a ‘pacify and de-escalate’ attitude even in the face of extreme provocation. This means that some of the best armies in the world, with sophisticated weaponry at their disposal, are not necessarily the best peacekeepers.

**Ghana Armed Forces Training Philosophy/Challenges**

The fundamental training philosophy of Ghana Armed Forces whether for combat or peacekeeping is ‘proper preparation prevents poor performance’. Accordingly pre-operational training has become a mandatory requirement for all peacekeeping battalions no matter how many times troops might have served in previous peacekeeping missions. Troops are camped for a minimum of four weeks for purposes of marrying up and carrying out joint training.

One essential element of the pre-operation training is a complete understanding of the political, social and cultural dynamics of the conflict zone from the micro-level of the military on up through the entire chain of command. A basic understanding of the laws of armed conflict and the UN Charter as they relate to peace support operations is also paramount, especially in Chapter VII operations where the use of force is authorized. Commanders at all levels should also have training in negotiating and mediation skills.

**Shortfalls Which Need Addressing**

One of our largest problems is the need for language training, and to that end modern language labs have recently been established for the Ghanaian Armed Forces. The second shortfall is the lack of a comprehensive Ghana Armed Forces Peacekeeping Doctrine. Such a doctrine should generate the standardization of operational methods and SOPs for both military and civilian components. It is perhaps providential that with the establishment of the KAIPTC, the first important step has been taken in this direction, not only for Ghana, but also for the entire sub-region and indeed the international community. Thirdly, greater focus needs to be placed on the psychological well-being of returning troops, especially those who were on genocide-related
missions. Troops on peacekeeping duties undergo a lot of stress and many develop post-traumatic stress syndrome. Fourthly, because of the modern proliferation of information greater emphasis needs to be placed on media management, so that peacekeeping forces are portrayed in the best possible light both within the host country and the international community. Ultimately, peacekeeping operations continue to be a battle for the 'hearts and minds' and there is no better weapon for winning this ‘battle’ than the media. Finally, the lack of intelligence capability continues to be a serious limitation to current and future operations and needs to be addressed.

**Conclusion**

Every professional military force must be able to strike a balance in its strategy, training and planning so that it continues to retain policy options for both war and peacekeeping. Its force structure must allow it a freedom of action to switch from the art of war-making to the art of peacekeeping, without loss of professionalism.

For this to materialise, a training doctrine, that is both flexible and adaptable, needs to be developed. For training purposes it would be useful to have detailed and well-documented knowledge of previous peacekeeping operations and a systematic method of training aimed at all levels. At this time it seems that the future of the military will be in peacekeeping therefore greater attention needs to be paid to it by all militaries.

2. **The Training and Education Need From a Police Perspective - Superintendent Dag Dahlen (Norway)**

The deployment of police officers to peacekeeping missions is a rather new evolution in peace support operations which began with Namibia in 1988. Currently the National Police Academy of Norway alone has more than 25 civilian police operations forming part of the United Nations, or other organisations’ activities.

Today the UN civilian police play a crucial role in UN peacekeeping operations. Everyday, eight thousand police assist in a range of fields in UN missions, including advising local police, patrolling, providing training, and assisting with compliance and regulation of human rights practices. The benefits of including police in PSOs are clear: It helps to create a safer environment, leaves the communities better protected, and prevents or disrupts criminal activities.

The diverse national experience of the civilian police is an important element of their success in promoting the rule of law. The mandates of UN civilian police differ for each mission. Some mandates are limited to monitoring the local police service; others include advisement, training, establishing a local police service and enhancing their work; and a few empower the UN law enforcement with complete executive power and a full range of means to carry that into effect.

Due to the extent of UN civilian police activities in PSOs, full training of those to be deployed is required. There are clear selection standards for UN civilian police and member states are expected to follow these standards. The complexity and breadth of the missions denotes that the civilian police peacekeeping force is not for the unmotivated, nor should it be used as a ‘dumping ground’ for substandard national officers. Officers must be willing to commit to the challenge of the mission, and should therefore never be forced into serving in the field. They should have a minimum of five years of policing experience in the community field. Currently, less than 50% of the member states contribute CIV-POL officers and of those, only 10-15% requires this degree of community policing experience. To ensure police on peacekeeping missions meet the highest of standards, not only should UN member states follow the prescribed selection process, but so should the OSCE, the EU, and other police-contributing organisations. It is as crucial to employ an excellent screening process before deployment as to have adequate training.
Training is the responsibility of member states, but not all have the capacity. National basic police training varies from three months to three years. Peacekeeping training runs from 0-3 months for some countries. To this end, UN CIV-POL contributing countries and member states need to make resources available to those countries that do not have the capacity to adequately train their civilian police for PSOs. Resource-sharing can be a major asset in this area. In Scandinavia, the Nordic countries all share training responsibilities and send officers back-and-forth across borders to attend varying courses. This cost-effective strategy should be examined for feasibility in West Africa and other geographically viable regions. Alternatively, the UN Training and Evaluation Service (TES) may assist in providing the necessary resources.

Norway, for one, has developed a National Training Assistance Team based on training-of-trainers. This team was recently used to train Afghani police. Training-of-trainers fulfils the long-term goal of building capacity in trainers and programmes. SADC has been involved in training-of-trainers since 1998. By 2005 they should be self-sufficient in training capacity, and in trainers themselves.

The police welcome the standards and training guidelines of STM1. The module increases understanding on multi-functional missions. However, STM1 can still be improved to help achieve performance objectives. More time needs to be allocated in the module to the sections on attitude and behaviour, stress management, media relations, and law enforcement training. Ideally, however, training modules should be based on needs assessment, and not just be ‘cookie cutters’ from the UN.

The section on law enforcement should include more training in international law elements such as human rights standards. An understanding of these issues by peacekeepers on mission is crucial for success in PSOs. In addition, training in fundamental areas such as human rights would allow trainers to bring that knowledge back to their home countries and implement it in their own national training. Another issue is the inclusion of police and security reform as part of DDR tasks. In complex operations that entails providing law enforcement advice, it would be more efficient and effective if the responsibility to do this fell belonged to a single organisation. In truth, security reform is a long-term task that requires a full staff of relevant police and civilian professionals.

Civilian police training faces other obstacles as well. For one, language and map-reading continue to be of concern. Secondly, training materials need to be made available to all member states in hard copy, since not all countries have adequate computer capabilities. And finally, the Civilian-Police Handbook written in the mid-1990s needs to be updated.

The Training and Education Need From a Civilian Perspective - Dr Winrich Kühne (ZIF Germany)

Civilians are often referred to as the ‘weakest link’ in peace support operations. It helps to keep in mind, however, that while military peacekeeping activities began in 1948, civilian police and civilians have only been involved for about fifteen years. Furthermore, the culture of peacekeeping missions is similar to that of the military and police, whereas it is an entirely new experience for civilians. Canada and the Nordic countries were the only countries that placed civilian peacekeeping on their national agenda from an early stage.

The sheer diversity of civilian peacekeeping positions and skills makes it difficult to do a focused training course. Instead, training centres offer a basic, general course that profession-specific courses will later build on.

The need to integrate and work within military and/or police culture often poses a particular challenge to civilians. Another problem with civilian peacekeeping includes the long-time neglect of security training. More
civilians have died on missions than police or military personnel, yet civilian peacekeeping training does not adequately cover security issues.

To plan and to conduct field oriented training courses for civilians is a particular challenge due to the sheer volume of material that should be covered. Considerable debate goes into formulating the right mix of subjects to be included in such courses. Feedback from the field indicates that civilian peacekeepers desire more training in the areas of reporting, management, radio communication, and so forth as opposed to more traditional topics such as conflict resolution, human rights, and negotiation. Finding the right trainers also remains problematic. This is also foreseen as an issue for STM3. An excellent field operative does not necessarily translate into an excellent trainer.

It is important that the course includes not only case studies and group work but also field exercises. This remains a weak aspect in civilian peacekeeping courses. The inclusion of integrated exercises would help familiarise civilians with the other functional cultures prior to deployment into the field.

To address some of these obstacles ZIF, for one, sends their course participants to a military base for two or three days of training. They train their participants in many aspects of security, including mine awareness, snipers, and hostage-taking. It is imperative to discourage “peace tourism” and make clear that the security dangers are real. In addition, ZIF includes a section on practical four-wheel driving in response to evidence that the greatest cause of death in the field is in fact automotive accidents.

The major difficulty in civilian training, however, is linking the processes of training to recruitment and deployment. Whereas the military and police only train those scheduled or likely to be deployed, there is no such automatic mechanism in the civilian sector. The diversity and unstructured nature of the civilian sector also makes assessment, feedback, and pre-deployment screening difficult to supervise.

Discussion Session with Panellists- Questions and Comments

International School of Excellence for Training International Police

In June the G-8 leaders met at Sea Island, Georgia, USA to discuss expanding world-wide peacekeeping capacity. In the course of their discussions, the leaders recognised the need for international police and agreed to establish an International School of Excellence for Training International Police. The School will be co-located with the Italian Calbinari School as a separate institution. All of the G-8 members have agreed to finance the project to some extent. The school will open in Fall 2005 and looks to train 2000 international police each year. The primary focus will first be for missions in Africa.

Shortfalls in Training

There are many current shortfalls in peacekeeping training. One major obstacle is the lack of intelligence gathering on peacekeeping missions. Soldiers are accustomed to access to extensive intelligence before they go into the field. Originally, it was thought that gathering intelligence would compromise the impartiality of the peacekeeping mission. In reality, sending ill-informed troops on any type of mission is dangerous and the quality of intelligence on peacekeeping missions should be equal to that of any other mission.

Similarly, the training itself has to be relevant. Receiving training for training’s sake from donors does not further the quality of peacekeeping. Examples of training missions consisting of unarmed or poorly armed troops are rampant.

Another source of danger is the ambiguity of many of the mission mandates. Mandates should be properly specified and readily changed if need be so peacekeepers do not find themselves in harm’s way.
A major challenge for leaders of peacekeeping missions is how to maintain troop morale, particularly in a genocide-related situation. The troops must be able to overcome their fear. A leader may achieve this through personal discussions on the political situation, their mission purpose, et cetera to give the troops resolve.

The Need for a National Peacekeeping Doctrine?
There is disagreement in the peacekeeping community as to whether it would be useful to set up national peacekeeping training doctrines, or if it is necessary to include STMs in basic and/or career training for all disciplines. In addition, there is much debate whether security training should be compulsory prior to deployment for civilians. The DPKO, for example, established the policy after the bombing of UN headquarters in Iraq that civilian, military, and police peacekeepers must undergo security training or they will not get a passport and visa to go to the mission area. This policy holds true even for consultants. The DPKO staff themselves are not allowed to leave NY if they do not pass the security test. Politically, this represents a challenge because while all member states would like to participate, not all have training centres. Partnership agreements could be a viable solution to this issue.

Part II - Reviewing Current and Possible Approaches to Meet the Needs

Addressing the Training and Educational Needs - Training Centre Perspective - Colonel John Kane (KAIPTC)

In order to adequately address the training and educational needs of the peacekeeping community, training centres must define their customer base according to their organisational capacity. No single training centre can provide expertise on all aspects of peace support operations. The KAIPTC, for example, focuses on the operational level. To this end, training institutions need to establish partnerships with one another in order to provide their clients with the best possible mission preparation.

There are two major obstacles to interagency cooperation. Firstly, in many cases training centres and like-minded organisations simply do not know what one another are up to, even if the organisations are located within the same region. Secondly, institutional competition tends to be exasperated by donors. Resource availability should not dictate training priorities. Donors, however, generally fund what they have an interest or knowledge in, and do not necessarily look to addressing training gaps. A regional oversight mechanism should be established to evaluate training gaps, and donors should be forced to comply with that assessment.

In turn, customers must articulate their training needs to the centres. A realistic agreement may then be reached between the client and the training centre outlining the goals, expectations, and progression of training. Training-the-trainer, for example, might not be appropriate for some in the developing world since the programme does not build capacity on its own. It only works if those trained returns to a situation where they has the resources available to train others. In the developing world, this is often not so.

Therefore, training approaches should differ according to the reality of the mission. For this reason, training centres should take part in policy development to a certain extent. They should identify training needs and relay their findings to relevant organisations.

Finally, the link between training and actual deployment needs to be strengthened. Obviously, it would be most beneficial, not to mention cost-effective, to train those actually involved in PSOs.
Addressing the Training and Educational Needs from the Military Perspective -
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Haindl - Canadian Forces

The Strategy for Peacekeeping Training in Canada
The generic training system used in Canada allows training institutions to assume that the soldiers undertaking their courses have received proper basic training for both individual and collective tasks. Therefore, regardless of whether the mission is for individual or contingent deployment, the level of peacekeeping training that most institutions focus on is non-traditional mission-specific training and pre-deployment and in-theatre training.

The Curriculum for Non-Traditional and Mission-Specific Training
In the Canadian training model, the first six subjects taught to prospective peacekeeping troops are generic and quite similar in content to the UN STM modules. The next part of the training process is mission and function-specific. One of the challenges in offering tailored training is keeping the course content accurate and current.

The training centre in Kingston has made this a priority, and as a result is known as the Centre for Excellence for Peace Support Operations within Canada. It employs a cadre of expert, experienced PSO instructors and has been formalised since 1996. The Centre employs an international mix of instructors due to the importance it places on cultural awareness in peacekeeping. After-action reviews by course participants show that elements of the course are helpful regardless of the rank of the participant. The Centre also invites guest speakers, particularly those who have just come back from the relevant mission, and professional experts to add diversity to the course-learning experience.

The evaluation process after soldiers return is a key element to the future success and relevancy of the training centre. Evaluation and validation are imperative to keep courses credible and current. Training institutions may use post-course questionnaires and instructor comments or have discussions and focus groups while and/or after the mission is in the theatre. Valuable training material can be prepared from this information.

Training Material
A training plan exists for each course. Courseware includes a PSO field book entitled Techniques, Tactics and Procedures for Tactical Level Peace Support Operations (TTPs). There are also specialised, regularly-updated packages that have incorporated all lessons-learned prior to the course. Another unique element of the programme of Canadian military training institutions is the pairing of command teams: Each commissioned officer is paired with a non-commissioned officer so that they continue to train as they are deployed.

Shortfalls of Training
There needs to be a peacekeeping education requirement incorporated into career development so that the soldiers do not lose the peacekeeping skill sets as they proceed through their career. To that end, continual training for career officers is one of the Canadian military’s focuses at the moment. Secondly, SNCO and Jr NCO training and education needs to be improved.

PSOs is part of collective training, and Canada runs brigade level training events. The concept of 3-block war and its training is being introduced slowly.

Training for Multi-dimensional and Complex Missions of Today
It is important to conduct peacekeeping training in the configuration in which the mission will be deployed. The curriculum should be modularised so that every lesson can be tailored to fit the training needs of today’s complex missions. In order to ensure that the training is in tune with the mission requirements and objectives, it would be academic to include the trainer in any planning, pre-forecast, or reconnaissance before the mission.
Addressing the Training and Educational Need - Police Perspective - Inspector Doug Coates (PPC)\(^6\)

**Introduction**

Since the late 1980s peace support operations have been given multi-functional mandates. This has increased the role of civilian personnel, and specifically that of civilian police (CIVPOL). This in turn has increased the demand for well-trained, experienced CIVPOL. Now the international community is looking to African CIVPOL to provide leadership for the growing number of African peace support operations. This means sustainable training programmes that effectively respond to African issues need to be developed.

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) has been involved in the training of African CIVPOL for peace support operations since 2000. It has assessed existing training structures, programmes, and methodology and identified the following needs: a greater commitment from political and senior police officials; the development of regional capacity; and the strengthening of national training structures.

**Context of CIVPOL training**

The evolution of CIVPOL functions has had a direct impact on CIVPOL training requirements. Armed CIVPOL missions in Kosovo (1999), and East Timor (1999) have had executive mandates in which CIVPOL was responsible for the maintenance of law and order while a new police force was trained. Currently in Haiti CIVPOL are armed and have limited enforcement authorities. Their primary mandate is the training and development of the Haitian National Police. The UN Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitored police organizations, provided training, and investigated human rights violations and organized crime activities.

CIVPOL staff are experienced and trained in domestic policing; however need additional training to strengthen their effectiveness in an international environment. Moreover, as the Brahimi Report suggests, CIVPOL requires a permanent selection process; international training standards which are met before deployment; and the right equipment available at the right time.

The demand for trained CIVPOL in UN operations has increased by approximately 40% between 1995 and 2004. In the next five years 27,580 trained CIVPOL will be needed worldwide and 8,000 of those should be African. This figure demonstrates the need for African CIVPOL leadership in peace support operations. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has focused on strengthening African leadership in the resolution of African issues. NEPAD addresses the need for African countries to fill the gap of CIVPOL requirements. As Ambassador for Canada to the UN, Robert Fowler stated: "Our role is to help Africa help itself. Training thus needs to be increased not just qualitatively, but quantitatively as well".

**Needs assessment for African training**

The DPP have identified ten essential skills for CIVPOL personnel: leadership, critical thinking, conflict resolution, problem-solving, learning facilitation, communications, professionalism, decision-making, inter-cultural sensitivity and effective presentation.

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\(^6\) This is a summary of the paper presented at the workshop to reflex speaking notes. A copy of the unedited version is available on the www.kaiptc.org.

\(^7\) For the purposes of this presentation ‘civilian police’ includes police and gendarmerie participating on international peace operations.
Many African CIVPOL are deployed to peace support operations without any training. Feedback indicates that training is required to strengthen their contributions and leadership. Effective training would fill the gap between actual and required competency levels. Assessing where this gap is and filling it would be more useful than generic training. The following four major steps were taken in the evaluation of these needs by the PPC.

I. Mission Report from a delegation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (1999)
In June 1999, a PPC delegation travelled to Mali, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire to evaluate training needs as part of the Projet de formation en matière de paix et de sécurité initiative. This investigation conducted interviews with government authorities, military and police officials, as well as with representatives from local and international NGOs.

The security sector forces were seen by their respective communities as ineffective and unable to respond to the security needs of the population. In the case of the police, these problems were clearly linked to an absence of infrastructure, lack of funding, and police specific training. Police training needed to cover the control of small arms, an awareness campaign on human rights and an explanation of democratic processes. PDCMPS objectives in 2001 were to increase the capacity of recipient states in Francophone Africa to take part in peace operations to promote human security in their homeland and to support the emergence of local security in peace operations initiatives by involving regional and national action groups in their human security development efforts (PDCMPS).

By establishing effective national police forces there should be a positive impact on the African ability to contribute effectively to peace support operations. Interviews conducted in 2004 with West African police organizations further support this.

In March 2004, a senior police executive seminar was held at KAIPTC. Organized by the Civilian Police Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, this seminar confirmed the need to strengthen the African CIVPOL contribution to peace support operations. The problems of regional and national African training programs were a significant concern to most participants. Without the capacity to adequately prepare CIVPOL for missions, the contribution of African leadership to peace support operations will not improve. To improve police effectiveness existing infrastructure needs improving, increased funding for training materials must be made available, managers and trainers must be developed, national CIVPOL training centres must be reinforced, and the appropriate participants must be selected.

In an effort to address more specifically the competency gap, the DPP held a workshop at the KAIPTC. Eight senior CIVPOL with mission experiences, from six different African countries were invited to identify required core skills which would strengthen African CIVPOL contributions to peace support operations.

They were asked to identify what they believed were the basic functions for advanced policing methods. Some of the questions which arose were: What are the roles of CIVPOL in peace support operations; how are the complex problems faced in peace support operations solved; how are the Community Policing models

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8 Based on numerous interviews conducted from 1997 to 2004 in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Kosovo, Western Sahara, East Timor and Bosnia Herzegovina, as well as multiple meetings with senior CIVPOL officials responsible for West African police organizations.
9 The PPC delegation included the author, Jocelyn Coulon and Colonel Mike Morrison.
10 For the purpose on this document, the security sector forces include military and police forces, as well as correctional and customs services.
implemented in peace support operations; how to testify in a Court of Law; and how are new recruits effectively trained and coached.

IV. New requirements for a different social reality (2004)
Evaluation of the PPC CF20E “In the Service of Peace: Police Core Competencies in Peace Operations” pilot course delivered last July with KAIPTC highlighted that traditional teaching methods did not facilitate effective learning for African CIVPOL. Didactic instructional techniques supported by heavy readings and occasional exercises were ineffective in developing competency. The challenges faced in teaching were: limited attention spans, different literacy levels, a lack of common language, and cultural and social differences.

Addressing learning challenges
For effective training the course’s content needs to be adapted to the African context and the method needs to be adapted for African learners.

The PPC has implemented the Problem-Based Learning (PBL) approach. PBL is a learning methodology that allows participants to learn while solving problems or developing responses to actual situations. By focusing on real life situations, the learners are not solely using information given through didactic presentations or heavy readings. This method provides a sense of reality and allows participants to identify the information they require to solve the problems. These factors motivate participants to seek additional information, and in the process, accomplish stated learning objectives.

Classroom presentations by subject-matter experts become just one of several learning tools. Thus, the level of literacy is less of an issue. This also means a learner, working in his/ her second or third language, can obtain and assimilate the information required in order to meet learning objectives.

Each member of a working group possesses training and experience that can contribute to the resolution of the problem. The complex situations faced by CIVPOL in PSOs require CIVPOL to work in partnership with other international police, as well as other members of the international community. Teambuilding and effective teamwork are important elements to the participant’s ability to resolve problems. This requires respect and understanding for each team member and respect for traditional cultural and social differences. Without cooperation among the participants, resolving the problem will be impossible.

By putting the burden of learning on the shoulders of the participant, PBL helps facilitators to constantly evaluate the content/learning ratio. This provides for the addition of material necessary to ensure that participants are in fact learning and developing the competencies required for them to contribute effectively to peace support operations.

Conclusion
A training method adapted to the African context is needed in order to increase African capacity to provide leadership in peace support operations. This is, however, not enough; the problem must be addressed in a broader context. The DPP is working on the development of a multi-layered strategy: Leaders must first build a strategic framework of what they want to achieve. Only then can the international community work with them to support that vision and an action plan be produced. Finally instruction-building can meet the demand.

11 This does not detract from the need to provide supporting documentation for those who wish to pursue a topic further. It simply means that learning should not be dependent upon extensive readings.
12 This creates an opportunity for multi-disciplinary training in which military, police and civilians can solve problems in a classroom environment that they will likely be required to resolve together in the field.
CIVPOL training programs are limited by the political willingness of governments and senior police officials to
develop the sustained capacity to consolidate effective national training programmes. It is important to ensure
that government and senior police officials understand the critical issues associated with African CIVPOL
participation on peace support operations and commit to supporting the structural, management and training
needs of both regional and national training centres. Regional senior executive seminars provide a forum in
which these issues can be addressed and where appropriate regional and national level action plans can be
developed.\textsuperscript{13}

In conclusion, the increased requirement for African CIVPOL has allowed DPP to assess the core
competencies necessary for CIVPOL to function effectively in peace support operations. However,
strengthening the African CIVPOL contribution to peace support operations goes beyond adapting the course
content to the African context. We must also consider the best ways of facilitating the effective learning of
participants. Finally, to be successful, it is important to develop a multi-layered strategy designed to strengthen
existing African capacity to provide CIVPOL leadership in peace support operations.

\textsuperscript{13} These seminars would also serve as a mechanism to identify individuals who could serve in senior positions on CIVPOL
operations.
Addressing the Training and Educational Need - Civilian Perspective  
Arno Truger (Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution)

The Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) started a civilian peacekeeping training programme in 1992 at the request of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Due to the lack of established training requirements and precedents, the Centre based its training programmes on interviews, research, and the outcomes of field trips. In 2001 the ASPR became co-ordinator of a European Union project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management. The project was a result of the European Union’s peace keeping experiences in the Balkans and its decision to develop civilian capacities in the fields of civilian police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection.

The EU had several options for the development of training capacities. It could have tasked an established institution, founded a new one, or tasked a group of training institutes within the European Community to share the responsibility. The latter idea took advantage of available resources, yet allowing the programme to remain decentralised. Identified training institutions accordingly developed training modules and pilot programmes for civilian peacekeeping courses.

Since EU member states also participate in UN and OSCE peacekeeping missions, the project addresses the needs of organisations besides the EU. However, the question of who exactly was the programme’s target audience remained unanswered. Initially, programme designers assumed civil servants would be the target audience. It became apparent, however, that civil servants do not necessarily adapt well to field functions nor are they readily available for deployment. Recruitment soon began to focus on NGOs as well.

The training programme for the civilian sector is directed to the entire conflict cycle- preventive, management, and post-conflict functions. Integrated training is useful for aspects of the programme like DDR where military and police would be included. It is also advantageous to familiarise civilians with police and military culture.

Trainers need to include components on peacekeeping theory, mission experience, and practical skills into the courses. It is also important to reflect the mission setting through an international mix of course participants and teachers to promote cultural awareness.

There are five stages of the training process. The first stage is basic, technical training in areas such as the various elements of a peace support operation and communications. The second stage is function-specific training, where participants learn how to translate their functional skills to use in the field. The third is mission induction training, and includes learning the mission mandate as well as the security, cultural, economical situation on the ground. Organisational matters are also covered at this stage. In the fourth stage, any additional training that is warranted is completed. The final stage of training is the debriefing after completion of the mission.

The EU training programme has had many unintended benefits as well. The training institutions asked member states to nominate participants. Overall, this not only raised awareness of the need for civilian training, but caused the states to realize that they had no system for nominating or deploying civilians. As a result, institutions were established to facilitate the process. In addition, member states who had not previously contributed could now nominate civilians and send them abroad to be trained.

The shortcomings of the programme include linking the trained to deployment. Some experts believe that making rosters of those trained at institutions would allow organisations like the EU, UN, and OSCE to select
qualified individuals. In addition, the diverse nature of the civilian sector makes both individual assessment and programme evaluation difficult.

**Panel Discussion - Identify the Gaps between Need and Current Practice**

A major challenge in training-of-trainers programmes is retaining those who have successfully completed the programme as future trainers. Those who are trained often do not return to their countries to then train others, as many are either deployed or their home countries lack the necessary resources to run the training session. In addition, many go on missions because it is a once-in-a-lifetime experience or to make money, without ever having the intention of training others upon their return. Unfortunately, this is ultimately a human resource strategy problem.

Recruitment for peacekeeping missions remains a unique problem for the civilian sector. The UN requests the member states to supply civilian peacekeepers, yet does not supply a standard recruitment process to be followed. Accordingly, each organisation has its own recruitment process.

There is disagreement among the peacekeeping community as to whether rosters are useful to this end. Some examples of rosters that seem to work well for recruiting civilian peacekeepers are those maintained by NORDEM and the EU election observation roster.

For its part, the UN has a Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) that has 78 officers on the list. It was used for the first time in Côte d’Ivoire. There is movement now within the UN to create two brigades that have the ability ready themselves for deployment within seven days. The major TCCs for UNSAS will most likely be India and Pakistan. As of now, however, no one on the list has the rank of Brigadier-General or higher. Governments are simply not yet willing to have such high ranks on emergency stand-by. In addition, the UN maintains an emergency standby police officer list, but to date it has never been employed.

**Part III - Small group discussions and presentations to propose ways of closing the training needs/delivery gaps**

**Moderators Sandra Dunsmore and Mark Malan**

The moderators offered a choice of two topics for discussion in the Multi-Functional Groups. The first topic dealt with integrated training and the participants where asked to consider the following: Is there a requirement? What are the obstacles and what can we do to overcome those obstacles?

Mrs Dunsmore suggested that those who train together work better together. She emphasized that role-playing exercises, where a military course participant acts the role of a NGO, for example, does not work. Guest lecturers and teaching aides, on the other hand, are certainly more realistic, but still not ideal. The question
posed to the groups was: Can we move beyond that into truly multi-functional training? The groups were asked to consider integrated training in terms of both generic and mission-specific training.

The second topic concerned so-called “capacity-building.” By way of introduction Mr Malan put forward the proposition that institutions have become increasingly compliant to donor-inspired calls for proposals for “capacity-building.” “Capacity-building,” however, has not been clearly defined or even analysed for feasibility. Funding for capacity-building proposals is usually for one to three years: Therefore, is it even possible to “capacity-build” in the short period of time available?

The three Multi-Functional group discussions were led by Dr. Andreas Vogt (Norway TfP) - Group A, Detective Chief Inspector Peter Heepen (Germany) - Group B, and Colonel Robert Sackey (KAIPTC) - Group C.

**Group A Presentation**
The group chose to discuss integrated training and found that initiatives for integration are not universally welcomed. The debate centred on the definition of “integrated training” and what precisely it entails.

To that end, the group focused primarily on generic training instead of the more complex mission-specific training. Consensus was reached that integrated training is most feasible when dealing with very basic peacekeeping concepts, or what was referred to as “Peacekeeping 101.” More specialised generic training focusing on DDR or human rights, which are issues that transcend the various functional groups, could follow if the initial training was successful.

The group highlighted several distinct advantages of integrated training. For one, it fosters a common understanding amongst the functional groups and facilitates interoperability. Secondly, there is significant potential for enhanced mission efficiency since the mission would have already worked out effectiveness issues in a controlled environment. This increased efficiency and effectiveness would help the mission reach their strategic goals more quickly. These advantages translate into a more cost-effective mission.

There are, however, distinct disadvantages. Ensuring the right cross-section of professions at the training sessions would be inherently difficult, especially for training at the tactical level. The number of military peacekeepers outflanks the civilians and police by a huge ratio. Further, there are limited advantages for civilians to gain employment in peacekeeping missions, so recruiting civilians is notoriously difficult. Normally a 50% vacancy rate of civilian positions exists in the field, further exacerbating the balance of professions in an integrated training course. Another obstacle to integrated training is the lack of international standards, generic tools, and guidelines for such a course. Thirdly, the sheer diversity of language and cultural differences impedes training. Finally, funding would also be an issue.

Several steps could be taken to overcome these obstacles. The first is to ameliorate communication with the civilian sector. Focus on communicating with institutions and organisations, marketing the courses, identifying training needs, and corresponding training schedules to institution needs. Secondly, the UN, international forums, and peacekeeping training centres need to take the initiative to address the need for integrated training guidelines, and this information should be disseminated throughout the peacekeeping community.

**Group B - Presentation**
This group also heavily debated the issue of integrated training. For the purpose of the discussion and presentation, the group defined “integrated training” as simply referring to the activities performed by those
who have to work together in a peacekeeping format. The group also emphasised that integrated training should not replace functional training. It should build on job-specific training.

One challenge to successful integrated training identified by the group is the disparities in the way each functional sector receives training among the various peacekeeping training categories. Training could be based on UN STM’s “Four Cs”: Communication, Cooperation, Coordination, and Consensus in order to provide more consistency in peacekeeping training methods. Regional or country-based training centres would be the best forums for this type of training and the most cost-effective. The obstacle that would remain, however, is how to run multi-functional training courses in centres - even the joint training centres - that are still predominately military led. One important aspect would be to employ a multi-functional teaching staff.

Group B agreed the best vehicle for integrated training is exercises. Other options include basic foundation courses. Like Group A, Group B also highlighted the importance of including the various civilians the peacekeepers would find on the mission in the training. This unfortunately would make the training more difficult with civilian positions and skills in the field being so varied. The group also raised the issue of timing and emphasised that an effort should be made to coordinate the training for those who will actually be deployed together before they leave for the field.

Group C - Presentation
Group C reached a general consensus as to the need for integrated training. The question was the level, degree, and timing of such training. The group discussed the need and feasibility of assembling 15,000 or so peacekeeping troops for integrated training and concluded that while such a scenario is not very realistic, the benefits of integrated training would manifest itself even if only some of the troops took part in the training. They also pointed out that to a certain extent some integrated training is already ongoing through organisations like the PBU, PPC, and KAIPTC.

The group saw both cultural and functional differences as barriers to training. For one, there is a degree of suspicion and distrust of the civilian component by the military with regard to mission support. This sentiment highlights institutional differences: Whereas the military and police are already integrated to a certain extent within their functional group by nature, the diverse civilian sector has no coherency. This is especially evident when it comes to the selection process for peacekeeping missions, where it can take as many as six months for the DPKO to select civilian peacekeepers for a mission.

For integrated training to be successful there would need to be a harmonisation of peacekeeping centres. In addition, the issue of the level of member state’s contribution would have to be addressed. Troop contribution levels are not the same for member states so training and education would also have to be harmonised. Like the previous presentations, Group C cited language differences (especially at the mission area), and funding as other obstacles to integrated training.

The STM modules are seen as the proper vehicle for the evolving process to integrated training, and the group suggested that the IAPTC centres lead this movement. Incorporating the STMs into specific mission-oriented training and into the functional groups’ general education would facilitate a gradual evolution towards integrated training.

Discussion- Questions and Comments
There is a nuanced difference between training and education. Integrated training seems most likely to be successfully incorporated into peacekeepers’ education - what was also referred to in the discussion as “generic
A good rallying point for more specified training might be issues that concern all functional groups, such as gender, DDR, and human rights. The most likely method for successful integrated mission-specific training is if it is completed en route to the mission or in the field.

Whether or not PSO training should be part of career development has become a matter of some importance to troop-contributing countries as countries like Ghana witness peacekeeping switching from a secondary to a primary role for their forces. The practicality of incorporating the various aspects of PSO training into normal military and civilian police training depends on how often the member state participates in PSOs and its resources available for training.
Session IV Functional Committee Meetings

The purpose of the Functional Committee Meetings is to firstly elect the Functional Chairs for 2005 and secondly to address one of the seminar topic from a functional perspective. The Functional Committee Meetings were chaired as follows: The civilian group by Ms. Wibke Hansen (ZIF); The Civilian Police group by Inspector Doug Coates (PPC); and the Military Group by Deputy Inspector General Michael Okiro (Nigerian Police)

Functional Group Presentations - “Are We Meeting the Needs?”

Civilian Group
It is difficult to address the question of needs without first defining “civilians” - is the term restricted to within the mission implementation group or is it broader? What jobs does it refer to? ‘Civilians’ have even been reduced in some examples to the category of ‘miscellaneous’ due to their diversity. This diversity is further magnified by the difference in institutional mandates within which the civilian must operate.

The links between the civilian sector, the recruitment and deployment agencies, and organizations are very weak. Civilians often display frustration at the lack of a dialogue between civilians and the training institutions, and tend to feel disregarded by UN recruitment and deployment units.

There are many training needs, but two recurrent themes deemed to be vital to all civilian training for deployment are cultural awareness and security awareness. Unfortunately, although there is a lot of training available and a lot of demand, much of it is donor-funded and not strongly linked to recruitment and deployment organisations. An on going dilemma for civilian training is how to coordinate the training, recruitment, and deployment cycle when separate organisations are responsible for each phase of the process. Mandatory training and assessment is look favourably upon by the civilian sector. The diversity of the sector, however, makes proper assessment of pre-and post-deployment training difficult. Other problems include language and intercultural communication problems, as well as funding.

Civilian Police Group
Generic training in the civilian police sector should be bolstered by identifying training gaps and considering the needs assessment by individual countries. The contents and topics of police modules should be updated and kept current using this information.

Time allocation for peacekeeping training varies greatly. In some countries, civilian police training lasts for just three days, whereas in others it may be as long as three months. A general consensus sets sufficient training time allocation as consisting of two weeks of basic training followed by one week of pre-deployment training. The optimal methodology for successful police training is lectures with exercises and role-playing.

Over 10,000 civilian police need to be trained over the next five years. The questions of who, how, and where must still be answered.

When comparing national training programs and national civilian police management, huge gaps are evident between countries. This is particularly so with regard to their selection/screening processes, training programmes, deployment programmes, and amount of support given by the contributing country to the police in the field. The process of reintegration of police back into regular force also varies, with some countries having extensive programmes, whilst others have none.
Military Group
The military recognises the need for benchmarks to be established so that the sector may benefit from lessons learnt. The training modules already in place should be modified and continually updated to include the lesson learned on current missions. A soldier’s primary role is training. The best method for all training is reiteration. Therefore, peacekeeping training is necessary from basic training and throughout the soldier’s career.

Military peacekeepers also express concern over peacekeeping mandates. The military sector feels mandates should be explicitly put forward so that it incorporates the political, social, and humanitarian aspects of the crisis in its entirety so that no ambiguity remains for the soldier.

The military also highlighted the importance of pre-deployment training and the need for some aspect of commonality in training. The STMs should facilitate these needs and enhance operation output in the field. Unfortunately, the documents have yet to be disseminated to all the necessary peacekeeping centres and other organisations.

NATO/NATO School Presentation - Lt Col Peter Petutschnig

The presentation emphasized that there are other organisations than the United Nations running Peacekeeping or Peace Support operations, and reminded participants that NATO is, besides OSCE or EU, one of them. In 2005, the NATO School will have 85 different courses, and currently hosts around 9000 students per year coming from 60 different nations. These participants are mainly from NATO or Partnership for Peace (PfP) member states, but also interested parties from other nations may participate in a course on a case by case basis. One such multi-national course is the NATO School’s Peace Support Operations (PSO) Course, which takes place three (3) times per year. All present at the IAPTC 2004 Conference are eligible and are encouraged to attend.

Discussion- Questions and Comments
The DPKO’s primary means of communication with member states is through their heads of mission. The DPKO distributed copies of the available STMs to all 191 heads of mission at the UN in 2003, and sent a second copy in early 2004. A peacekeeping training centre may request a copy if they have not received one. The modules are currently available in English, Spanish, and Korean.
Session V Annual General Meeting and Closing Ceremony

Annual General Meeting
Items on the Agenda
1. The President’s Report (to be provided)
2. The Secretariats Report (to be provided)
3. Programme
4. Future Meeting
5. Structure
6. Any other business

It was announced that the Chilean Centre, CECOPAC, has offered its venue for the 2006 IAPTC. Any proposals for 2007 should be put to the current President, KAIPTC, or to the Secretariat. The Committee Chairs were also announced. They are as follows:

- Police Committee – Nigeria Police Force. (Deputy Inspector General Michael Okiro)
- Military Committee – CAECOPAZ (Colonel Gaston Fermepin)
- Civilian Committee – Training for Peace (Dr. Andreas Vogt)

The President stressed the importance in taking committee chairmanships seriously - emphasising the need to show up for the meetings and work throughout to improve their committee.

David Lightburn (Secretariat)
- Have adapted IAPTC programme to take into consideration suggestions by participants.
- Urged participants to let the secretariat know what they thought of the Conference.
- Suggested the simpler theme this year seemed to work. Sought participants’ advice/comments on the week.
- Info room, networking, and other ways of exchanging information- have we got that right?
- Length? What needs to be added, dropped and then rebalanced?
- The Programme itself

Programme changes:
- With respect to the issues considered by groups it was suggested that it may be better to assign topics rather than it being left up to the group.
- There also needs to be a balance of functions.
- The length of the conference is considered appropriate and there is certainly no need or desire to extend it.
• As it is often very complex working in Committees that are at such different levels – some tactical; some senior management, some strategic – advance notice of discussion topics would be useful.

• There was a call for paper by the Executive Committee with respect to possible discussion topics.

• The order of committees was discussed with the suggestion being that it may be more productive to reverse the order – accordingly go specific before multifunctional.

• There needs to be more focus on future development of training for longer term planning of programmes. A five year plan was suggested.

Structure:

Although it is an informal gathering there are certain formalities that need to be adhered to for planning the programme for the three disciplines. The lack of volunteers for the position of speaker continues to be a problem.

There was a proposal to tidy up the voting procedures with respect to the chairmanship of each of the committees. The Presidency and Executive Committee will be charged with coming up with proposals of how to elect chairs. Ironically it was noted that last year no one wanted the positions; this year there was too many. This will be addressed at the next Executive Committee meeting.

Suggestions:

• It would be beneficial to assign issues for multi-functional groups to consider so that they do not all choose the same issue next time.

• Do not extend the Conference length.

• Consider breaking up multi-functional discussion groups by levels.

• Consider distributing lists of discussion teams one or two weeks in advance so some may prepare if they wish.

• Theme: Instead of leaving it solely up to the host/secretariat, why not make a call for papers in March after Executive Committee meeting?

• Consider nominating vice-chairmen from the same region in case the chairman is otherwise engaged.

• Reverse order of committees. Meet as functional first, then multi-functional. For civilians, especially, the sector is so diverse no one knows who’s coming to the Conference. Team-building and issues would then be clearer going into the multi-functional.

• Focus more on future developments/forward thinking and not so much on past statistics. Consider looking at training for the next 5 years.
• Need proposals (charging Presidency and Executive Committee with this) for how to elect chairs.

• Having a larger UN delegation present would add value to the Conference.

• The attendance of regional organisations was appreciated.

There were discussions regarding the prospect of another institution taking over the Secretariat. In this regard Sandra Dunsmore indicated that PPC were looking for a secretariat replacement as PCC has done it for 10 years and there is now a need to open things up. Both availability of time and money are elements that need to be considered. An interested organization would need to find funds from their operational budget, and ideally it should be a multiyear arrangement. The process for nominations for a replacement secretariat needs to be done in a planned way. PPC wants to enter into a transitional process. A proposal will be put forward as to how things need to function for such a transition.

Colonel Günther Freisleben was announced past President; Brigadier General Charles Mankatah President; and Colonel Raj Rajput future President.
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<td>Josef Gunter</td>
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TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS:
ARE WE MEETING THE NEED?

Saturday 23 October

Administration and Registration on Arrival

Sunday 24 October

(Dress: Casual)

Administration and Registration on Arrival

0800-1700 Akosombo Senchi River Boat Trip

0800 Transport to Senchi

2000-2200 Icebreaker – Labadi Beach Hotel
       (Dress: Smart Casual)

Monday 25 October

(Dress: Formal, Suit and Tie)

Session I                Opening Session

0715-0830 Executive Committee Working Breakfast at Labadi Beach Hotel

0830 Transport from hotels

0900-0910 Procession to Auditorium for Opening Ceremony

0910-0930 Welcome – Major General E K Sam (Ghanaian Council of State)
0930-0940 Welcome – Brigadier General Charles Mankatah (Host)

0940-0950 Address – Colonel Guenther Freisleben (IAPTC President)

0950-1000 Group Photograph

1000-1030 Overview of Programme - IAPTC Secretariat

1030-1100 Refreshment Break in KAIPTC quadrangle

1030-1100 Press Conference: Colonel Guenther Freisleben, Brigadier General Charles Mankatah & Ms Sandra Dunsmore

   Moderator Brigadier General Charles Mankatah

1100-1200 Keynote Speech and Discussion
   Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai (Chief of Army Staff, Nigeria)

1200-1300 Initial Meeting of Functional Committees
   - To be elected (Military)
   - Doug Coates (PPC) (Civil Police)
   - Wibke Hansen (ZIF) (Civilian)

1300-1400 Lunch – KAIPTC (in marquees adjacent to Conference Centre)

**Session II**  
**Information Session**

Moderator Colonel Vidar Falck (Norway)

1400-1445 Best Practices Unit Presentation
   Mr David Harland (UN DPKO BPU)

1445-1500 UN Training Update
   Lieutenant Colonel Vasant Mande (UN DPKO TES)

1500-1530 Refreshment break KAIPTC quadrangle

1530-1545 OSCE Update
Mr Thomas Neufing

1545-1600  UN OHCHR Update
Ms Francesca Marotta

1600-1615  Challenges Project
Ms Annika Hilding Norberg

1615-1630  JICA Brief
Ms Naoka Imoto

1630        Transport to hotels

1800        Transport from hotels to Reception

1830-2000  Ghana Government Reception in Accra
(Dress: Formal, Coat and Tie)

2030        Poolside Buffet Dinner at Labadi

o/c          Bus Shuttle to La Palm Royal Beach Hotel

Tuesday 26 October
(Dress: Smart Casual)

**Session III**  **Annual Seminar**

0800        Transport from hotels to KAIPTC

Part 1  Moderator Ms Sandra Dunsmore (PPC)

Identifying the challenges and requirements based on personal experiences

0830-0835  Moderator’s Introduction

0835-0855  The training and education need from a military perspective
Brigadier General J N Adinkrah (Ghana)
0855-0915  The training and education need from a police perspective
Superintendent Dag Dahlen (Norway)

0915-0935  The training and education need from a civilian perspective
Dr Winrich Kuehne (ZIF Germany)

0935-1015  Panel Discussion

1015-1045  Refreshment Break in marquee adjacent to the Conference Centre.

Part II  
Moderator Mark Malan (KAIPTC)

Reviewing current and possible approaches to meet the needs.

1045-1050  Moderator’s Introduction

1050-1110  Addressing the training and education need - Training Centre
Perspective
Colonel John Kane (KAIPTC)

1110-1130  Addressing the training and education need - Military
Perspective
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Haindl (Canada)

1130-1150  Addressing the training and education need - Police Perspective
Inspector Doug Coates (PPC)

1150-1200  Addressing the training and education need - Civilian
Perspective
Dr Arno Truger (Austria)

1210-1250  Panel Discussion – Identify the gaps between need and current
practice

1250  Transport to Next Door restaurant

1300-1400  Lunch at Next Door

Part III  
Moderators Sandra Dunsmore and Mark Malan
Small group discussions and presentations to propose ways of closing the training needs/delivery gaps

1400-1415 Introduction to Multifunctional Group discussions

1415-1645 Group Discussions led by:
Group 1 - Mr Andreas Vogt (Norway TfP)
Group 2 - Detective Chief Inspector Peter Heepen (Germany)
Group 3 - Colonel Robert Sackey (KAIPTC)

1530-1550 Refreshment Break in marquee adjacent to the Conference Centre.

1645 Transport to hotels

1730 Transport to Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park

1800 Visit Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park
Witness Drummers and Dancers

1900 Depart for Noble House Restaurant
(Dress: Smart Casual)

Wednesday 27 October

(Dress: Smart Casual)

0800 Transport from hotels to KAIPTC

Session III Annual Seminar (continues)

Part III (Cont.) Moderators Ms Sandra Dunsmore and Mr Mark Malan

0830-1000 Presentations by multifunctional committees
Group discussion
Conclusions

1000-1030 Refreshment Break in marquee adjacent to the Conference Centre.
Session IV Functional Committee Meetings

1030-1035 Introduction to Functional Committee Meetings (Secretariat)

To address one seminar topic from a functional perspective

1030-1230 Functional Committee Meetings
   - Military Chair
     o Brief on RPTC Karen
     o Brief on NATO School
   - Civilian Police Chair - Doug Coates
   - Civilian Chair - Wibke Hansen

1230 Transport to Dutchotel

1245-1345 Lunch at Dutchotel

1345 Transport to KAIPTC

1415-1530 Functional Meetings (Cont)
   Election of Functional Chairs for 2005

1530-1600 Refreshment break in marquee adjacent to Conference Centre

1600-1715 Presentations by Committees
   Group Discussion

1715 Transport to hotels

1900 Transport to Army Officers’ Mess

1930 Dinner hosted by Ghana Armed Forces
   (Dress: Smart Casual)
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>0715-0830</td>
<td>Executive Committee Working Breakfast</td>
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<td>0830</td>
<td>Transport to KAIPTC</td>
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<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>Annual General Meeting of IAPTC</td>
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<td>1000-1030</td>
<td>Briefing on IAPTC 2005 in India</td>
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<td>Colonel Raj Rajput</td>
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<td>1030-1050</td>
<td>Refreshment break in KAIPTC quadrangle</td>
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<td>1050-1130</td>
<td>Conference Summary and Seminar Wrap-up</td>
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<td>- Outgoing President, Colonel Guenther Freisleben</td>
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<td>- Host and Incoming President Brigadier General Charles Mankatah</td>
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<td>- Secretariat, David Lightburn</td>
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<td>1130-1150</td>
<td>Closing Ceremony</td>
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<td>Brigadier General Charles Mankatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Prompt Coach Departure for Cape Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Packed Lunches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230</td>
<td>Lunch in hotels for participants not going to Cape Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1230</td>
<td>Executive Committee Working Lunch Labadi Beach Hotel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>